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Licensing in the Contemporary Information Economy 
Raymond T. Nimmer∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. economy continues to experience radical changes in the 
source of value and in how that value is commercially distributed. 
One can describe these changes in various ways, but by any 
description, they entail a diversification of business transaction 
models. This diversification is occurring in what is considered 
appropriate subject matter for a commercial transaction and in a 
blurring of lines among previously distinct areas of business and law 
practice.1 
Not surprisingly, changes of this scope fuel controversy and 
conflict. Many conflicts relate to how law should interact with the 
new economy. In some cases, the core of the conflict lies in a simple 
refusal by some to recognize that fundamental social and 
technological change cannot be reversed by law. In other cases, the 
conflicts are embedded in the fear surrounding where economic 
changes will lead us. Additionally, there are many issues on which 
 
 ∗ Leonard H. Childs Professor of Law and Co-Director, Intellectual Property and 
Information Law Institute. This Article was prepared for the 2001 Heart of America Intellectual 
Law Property Conference: “Intellectual Property, Digital Technology, and Electronic 
Commerce” co-sponsored by Washington University School of Law on April 6-7, 2001. 
 1. See, e.g., STAN DAVIS & CHRISTOPHER MEYER, BLUR: THE SPEED OF CHANGE IN THE 
CONNECTED ECONOMY 22 (1998).  
Clearly, it no longer makes sense to think of the world in terms of products and 
services Instead, we should be thinking more broadly of product-service hybrids—
“offers” in blurred lexicon. Offers are “productized” services and “servicized” 
products. They’re both fish and fowl, if you like. And more frequently, it will be hard 
to sell anything that doesn’t represent that combination. 
ROBERT REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS (1991). Terminology and practice are both also being 
changed. See Michael L. Rustad, Commercial Law Infrastructure For The Age Of Information, 
16 JOHN MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 255 (1998); Peter Lyman, The Article 2B Debate 
and the Sociology of the Information Age, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1087 (1998). 
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truly different political views exist about how a legal framework 
should be structured for the new economy as well as what actual 
interests should be protected at the expense of which others. 
The rhetoric of the debate is often needlessly vitriolic, but the 
reality centers on a single fact: intangible assets dominate the 
economy and entail much different policy and transactional 
characteristics than transactions in the old economy. The transition is 
from a hard-goods economy toward an economy of information, 
services, and other intangibles. As a focus for transactions and legal 
policy, intangible subject matter invokes different policy and 
commercial frameworks than that applicable to goods or real estate.  
This Article deals with licensing of information and, especially, 
licensing computer information.2 In the past several years, the 
economic transition we have experienced has engendered various 
attacks on licensing as a practice. One surrogate focus for these 
attacks is the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act 
(UCITA), a contract law statute modeled after the Uniform 
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) Article 2, but reflecting that when the 
subject matter of a transaction centers on rights to use information, 
different contractual frameworks and policy assumptions are 
appropriate than when a transaction deals with tangible subject matter 
(goods).3 Understanding the differences is critical to understanding 
the new economy. UCITA follows a rich contract law tradition of 
tailoring contract law principles to reflect particular contractual 
subject matter and frameworks.4  
 
 2. The term “computer information” comes from the text of the Uniform Computer 
Information Transactions Act (UCITA). Section 102(a)(10) defines computer information in 
relevant part as: “information in electronic form which is obtained from or through the use of a 
computer or which is in a form capable of being processed by a computer.” UCITA § 102(a)(10) 
(2000).  
 3. Indeed, especially with respect to transactions involving copies of computer programs, 
the parallel to Article 2 is especially explicit. Of slightly more than 100 sections in UCITA, in 
excess of seventy percent of all those sections which deal with such transactions are directly 
traceable to Article 2 doctrines and often follow them verbatim. Included in these sections are 
all of the important rules pertaining to consumer-related transactions, such as doctrines of good 
faith, unconscionability, implied warranty of merchantability, and implied warranty of fitness 
for a particular purpose.  
 4. See generally Karl Llewellyn, Across Sales On Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REV. 725, 
737 (1939); Raymond T. Nimmer, Images and Contract Law–What Law Applies to 
Transactions in Information?, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (1999). 
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This Article is not a defense of licensing or of UCITA. No defense 
of licensing is needed realistically any more than a defense of leasing 
or sales should be expected. Licensing has been an important 
framework for dealing with information assets for generations, dating 
back into at least the mid-1800s in this country. UCITA simply 
recognizes this history and other differences between digital 
information transactions and other types of commercial exchanges.  
Rather, this Article examines the role of licensing in our economy 
and discusses some misconceptions that relate, at least indirectly, to 
licensing as a means of distributing digital information. There are 
several basic points. First, discussed in Part II of this Article, is the 
simple fact that the modern economy, which is characterized by 
licensing as well as other transfers of informational assets, reflects a 
vibrant diversity. Demonstrably, there has not been a shrinkage or 
restriction of availability of information and information-based 
technology as some allegedly fear, but rather a vibrant expansion and 
diversification. In a market economy, this diversification and 
expansion occurs through transactional exchanges. Licensing 
transactions play an important positive role.  
The increased economic value of information is recognized in 
various law developments including expanding property rights in 
information. But licensing and UCITA do not deal with property 
rights, they deal with transactions. Information-based transactions are 
different from the goods-based transactions of older industries. These 
transactional differences are recognized in UCITA. The information 
industries that characterize the information economy do not rely on 
goods, but on distribution of informational assets under conditions 
suited to the market. UCITA and general licensing practice recognize 
and build legal models on that fact. 
Next, Part III examines the definition of a license and the 
attributes of that type of transaction in contrast to other ways of 
disseminating information. Licensing has an important role in the 
modern economy because license agreements allocate rights to use 
information or informational rights, and to access information 
resources. A license focuses directly on establishing what value is 
offered and what value a transferee purchases. Nonexclusive licenses 
are pro-distributive, they enable the information owner to give access 
to or rights to use informational assets to numerous persons while 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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retaining control of the fundamental informational asset and tailoring 
the rights given to a diversified marketplace.  
As recognized in UCITA, understanding the contours of a license, 
as contrasted to other transactions, entails understanding the different 
legal traditions and social policies that contribute to licensing law. 
UCITA and modern licensing law blend traditional license law 
concepts (which essentially treat a license as a narrow, limited 
transaction) and commercial views (which view transactions as more 
robust giving implicit assurances to the licensee about the quality as 
well as the right to use the licensed technology). 
Part IV turns to the legal foundations for the practice of licensing 
information, rather than selling copies or giving information away. 
The legal framework for licensing is deep and strongly embedded in 
our culture. It resides in the idea of a person’s right to control his own 
property as well as the basic concept that transactional effects in 
modern commerce are defined by the exchange of value under which 
contracting parties determine the conditions on which assets will be 
exchanged. Licensing enables the tailoring of information transfers to 
fit markets in ways that cannot occur in other exchanges.  
Finally, in Part V, we discuss the market effect of licensing. The 
impact of licensing, and of any associated property rights, cannot be 
assessed without accounting for the markets in which licensing 
functions. Examination of those market effects shows that a license 
allows parties to tailor rights and resulting costs in ways that less 
nuanced deals cannot. This allows fitting products and services to 
actual market demand and engaging in what one author describes as a 
process of “mass customization.”5 That description refers to a 
distribution of products to the mass market customized by contracts 
and technology without changes in the physical product. In allowing 
such practices, licensing law, as implemented in UCITA creates a 
structure in law that encourages information owners to distribute their 
products into the market, an objective which is also embedded in 
modern intellectual property law and that allows them to do so in an 
efficient manner that benefits all of us. 
 
 5. See STAN DAVIS, FUTURE PERFECT (1996); DAVIS, supra note 1.  
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II. CONTEXT 
The computer and digital information industries today comprise 
the most vibrant, competitive, and rapidly growing sector of the U.S. 
economy. Transactions in information account for a large portion of 
the gross national product; their importance continues to grow with 
the advent of the Internet as a focus of commercial activity.6 Indeed, 
it is difficult to identify any part of our economy that does not 
involve information-based technology and, yet, is experiencing rapid 
or even consistent growth. 
Industries associated with computer information led the 
resurgence of the U.S. economy and have a positive impact on 
consumers and commercial interests. Consumer choice and the 
richness of the marketplace for information has greatly expanded 
during the past several decades. There was and continues to be an 
explosion in the availability of information, in the options by which 
we obtain information, and in what types of information or 
functionality can be acquired. In short, this era represents broad 
growth and diversity with respect to information in the economy and 
in society as a whole. That result owes itself to the technology, to the 
fierce competition in the information industry, and to the diverse 
business, contract, and marketing models employed.  
This empirical background is important in any policy discussion 
about licensing computer information. The factual record directly 
challenges the validity of a commonly-stated concern about licensing: 
that concern alleges that dynamic changes in marketing and 
distributing information entail a risk of stifling free flow of 
information and asserts that this risk requires mandatory rules that 
lock in the information economy into transactions with legally 
mandated accouterments of so-called first sales of copies of 
 
 6. See AM. ELECS. ASS’N AND NASDAQ, CYBERNATION, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE HIGH-
TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY TO THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1998); DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. 
INDUSTRY AND TRADE OUTLOOK 24-28 (1998). The Internet aspect involves what some 
describe as electronic commerce. This sector of the economy experienced rapid growth. 
Electronic commerce will be the single most important factor in expanding international trade 
in the next century. Predictions range from $144 billion to $1.5 trillion by the year 2002. See 
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RESEARCH AGENDA 27 (1999). 
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information.7 That argument is wrong in policy and in fact. The 
empirical reality of licensing in modern commerce is quite the 
contrary. Licensing contributes to efficient tailoring of an information 
product and its cost to meet diverse market demands. This creates far 
greater diversity and opportunity for access to information. As a 
result of the diversified approaches to marketing information, we live 
in a world in which availability of information, digital functionality, 
and innovation reaches astounding heights. At best, then, the 
purported concern about licensing refers to a theoretical future, rather 
than present reality. Courts have adequate means to respond to such 
threats if and when its symptoms eventually emerge. 
Independent of licensing, the transition from a goods-based to an 
information-based economy results in changes in what modern 
society views as property or, at least, as assets appropriately subject 
to protection. The past two decades in this country have seen a 
general expansion in protected rights. These include, but are by no 
means limited to:  
State and federal enactment of criminal laws against 
unauthorized access to computer systems and disrupting the 
integrity of computer information, including data, within 
them.8  
Federal statutes expanding protection of marks and other 
business identifiers, such as the federal Anti-Dilution Act and 
the Anti-Cybersquatting Protection Act.9  
Numerous statutory changes in the Copyright Act that 
generally expand rights and technological control of digital 
information products.10  
 
 7. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1089 (1998); Mark Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual 
Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111 (1998); cf. David Friedman, In Defense of Private 
Ordering: Comments on Julie Cohen’s “Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help,” 13 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1151 (1998). 
 8. See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY ¶¶ 4.04-.12 
(1997). 
 9. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1999) (discussing antidilution: cyber-squatting). See generally 
NIMMER, supra note 8. 
 10. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1994) (mask work rights); 17 U.S.C. § 104A (1994) 
(restored works); 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (1994) (digital rights); 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994) (works of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/6
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Court decisions expanding patent law to business activities and 
business methods.11  
Court decisions applying the tort of trespass to chattel to set 
non-contractual controls on unauthorized use of online systems 
and information.12  
Court decisions applying copyright protection to systems 
involving estimated or summarized data when these are not 
considered as “unprotected facts.”13  
As is common with all areas of property law, in many of these 
respects, law did not establish comprehensive protections. Critical 
social and legal issues remain about the ultimate scope of this 
expanding matrix of protection. Yet, the trend is quite clear and quite 
clearly oriented toward expanding rights to reflect the changing 
nature of economic and social value in the present economy. 
Overall, this reflects a willingness by statute or by common law 
action to clarify rights in intangible assets. This is a direct product of 
social change and, in particular, of changing sources of commercial 
value. Digital assets and digital systems are commercially important, 
but rights associated with them were not explored until recently; 
indeed, they could not have been explored until recently. 
Traditional intellectual property law regimes have a long and rich 
history of debate concerning the balance between proprietary rights 
and unprotected zones.14 But this traditional scholarship and much of 
the base upon which it was founded was ripped apart and reshaped by 
 
visual art); 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994) (live performances); 17 U.S.C. 1205 § 1201 (security/ 
management devices). 
 11. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 
(Fed. Cir. 1998); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 12. See, e.g., e-Bay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp.2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000); 
Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat’l Health Care Disc., Inc., 121 F. Supp.2d 1255 (Iowa 2000) (Material 
issue of fact regarding responsibility for the acts of e-mailers precluded summary judgment on 
claim that message sender was liable for trespass to chattels; as predicted by this court, 
“trespass to chattels” is any unauthorized interference with or use of the personal property of 
another); cf. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1344 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (no 
trespass claim where system was in effect open to the public without effective restrictions). 
 13. See, e.g., CC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d 
Cir. 1994) (estimate of values of used cars).  
 14. See, e.g., RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY ch. 1 (1997). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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computer information technologies and the opportunities as well as 
risks they create. Much of the historical policy base was erected when 
intellectual property rights were in a backwater of a goods-based or 
real-estate based economy. In today’s economy, rights in information 
are very important.  
Value and Commercial Exchange 
To focus solely on intellectual property when discussing licensing 
is to miss an important point. Modern transactions in information do 
not always stem from intellectual property rights; often, such rights 
are irrelevant. As in any other commercial transaction, the central 
issue that determines when or whether a transaction occurs and under 
what terms concerns value in a market place. Does the transferor 
have sufficient valuable rights, control, money, knowledge, skill, or 
access to justify a transferee’s willingness to promise value in return 
for a transfer? Alternatively, is the transferee willing to give value to 
the licensor sufficient to induce the transferor to transfer its value to 
the purchaser? These transfers are facilitated through contracts which 
are by definition exchanges. The values available for exchange on 
either side take many forms, as do the conditions under which the 
exchange, if any, occurs.  
Value, rather than property rights, forms the basis for commercial 
exchange. Value comes in many different forms, of course. We could 
spend time trying to catalogue the sources of commercial value, but 
that would have little importance in this discussion. More 
importantly, we need to emphasize the obvious: what value is 
sufficient to support a contract from either side (licensor or licensee) 
depends on the market, not on the law regarding property rights. 
Property rights may sometimes be important in a market, but not 
always. What is critical is that there exists a sufficient basis for an 
exchange in light of the assets, rights, control, money, knowledge, 
skill, or access of both parties and in relation to the overall market. 
Many who criticize licensing digital information flounder on the 
simple idea of a market based on value, rather than on property, and 
the correlative concept of a market providing guidance on how values 
can best be shaped and distributed. Consider, for example, the 
comparative market value and influence of a patent on a chemical 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/6
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process and a database of unprotected public facts associated with 
chemical manufacturing. A prospective purchaser might value the 
patent at zero or a next to zero value because of competing available 
processes or because the patented technology entails costs that make 
the outcome unmarketable. On the other hand, the purchaser might 
place great value on the unprotected database because obtaining 
access to it from the particular licensor will save time, effort, and 
uncertainty about the reliability of the data. The property right may 
have far less market impact than the unprotected information. 
This illustration reflects what should be the obvious: interceding 
between property rights in the market are a variety of market factors 
and individual judgments about value and about the relevance of the 
asset being offered. One important function of licensing in the 
modern economy is that it is a contractual framework that enables 
parties to tailor assets to the market that may exist for them. This 
does not mean that all licensors and licensees are invariably correct in 
their choice or offers, but that the net of the process enables a more 
diverse and richly functioning marketplace for information. 
Consider the following illustration, which goes to the core of at 
least one aspect of the information economy: 
Illustration 1. Vendor collects data on the lifestyles of 
butterflies. All of the data is from public sources. Vendor 
places the data in an online database. It offers clients “reading 
access” for $100 per year under a contract that provides that 
the customer make no permanent copies of the data. It offers a 
separate agreement that charges $1,000 for access to download 
data on any butterfly but requires that the client not redistribute 
the downloaded data commercially. Client 1 agrees to the 
$1000 contract and downloads thirty pages of data concerning 
the Monarch butterfly. Client 2 declines the contract and 
obtains data on the Monarch butterfly from other public 
sources.  
In this context, the Vendor used technology, effort, and contract to 
create two information products: (1) a product involving contractual 
rights to access the database created by Vendor’s research, and (2) a 
product involving a contractual right to download certain information 
from that database subject to contractual limitations on use when the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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data are downloaded.  
Under any theory of contract law, Illustration 1 establishes a 
sufficient basis for a contract between Client 1 and the Vendor. Even 
though the butterfly data can be obtained elsewhere and even though 
the data are not copyrighted, obtaining access to the Vendor’s 
database may have value to a client. The two contractual 
arrangements (licenses) define products with entirely different types 
of value. The one is a reading service, while the other (the download 
license) offers more permanent availability of the data for consumer 
use. Yet, both products come from the same digital resource and both 
may have value to prospective clients. Indeed, the fact that Client 1 
agreed to the contract terms indicates that it believed that value was 
being offered. The Vendor was willing to provide value in return for 
a payment and a promise (no commercial redistribution). If a client’s 
assessment of the offer’s value overlaps that of the vendor, a contract 
may ensue if the parties each regard the exchange as beneficial to 
them. Contract law enforces any resulting agreement if there are 
sufficient indicia of assent and if the effect of the contract does not 
violate a fundamental public policy that overrides the policy of 
enforcing contracts.15 Indeed, as we discuss later, the ability to build 
different products from a single digital information resources 
represents an important use of licensing in the information 
marketplace. 
Why would any client contractually limit its use and agree to pay 
for information that could be obtained for free from other sources? 
The answer, of course, depends on various factors (e.g., ease of 
access, lack of time, reliability of the database, etc.). As the case of 
Client 2 in the foregoing illustration suggests, not all prospective 
clients will make the contract. One could ask, then, why would Client 
2 refuse the contract obligation that Client 1 accepted? Again, there is 
no single answer. Perhaps it is nothing more than that Client 2’s 
interest in Monarch butterflies was less than Client 1’s interest. 
Alternatively, perhaps Client 2 meant to use the data in commercial 
 
 15. See, e.g., UCITA § 105(b) (1999 Official Text). Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter 
Group, Inc., 61 Cal. App. 4th 881 (Cal. App. 1998); cf. Lowry Computer Prods., Inc. v. Head, 
984 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Mich. 1997). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§§ 178-99 (1979).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/6
p 99 Nimmer book pages  10/16/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002]  Licensing in the Information Economy 109 
 
 
redistribution, while Client 1 did not and, therefore, Client 2 could 
not use the product that was being offered.  
The foregoing represents an online version of a common 
circumstance in the digital information economy. The evaluation of 
whether or not a sufficient basis for contract exits does not depend on 
whether property rights exist in the subject matter. If a reasonable 
alternative exists that is similarly convenient and beneficial, but 
involves less cost (e.g., a lower price or less restrictions), the client 
will take that alternative transaction. If no alternative exists, the client 
may take the original offer if the value required matches or is more 
than the value that the client expects to receive as a result of the deal, 
or it may simply refuse to deal. Taken together, decisions of this type 
define the market for information or any other asset.  
The variables that affect market choices are numerous and often 
unpredictable in the real world. To see a further illustration of this, 
return to Illustration 1 and assume that Vendor 1 offers the terms 
stated in the illustration, but Vendor 2 offers the right to download a 
similar butterfly database for $1,500 without restrictions on reuse of 
the data. Both offers may exceed what a client is willing to pay, given 
the availability of doing without the data or of obtaining it from free 
sources. Assuming that this is not true, to predict which offer a client 
may accept, we need to know more about the product and the context. 
Consider the following possibilities: 
• Client does not care about making commercial distribution 
and, thus, receives nothing more of value from Vendor 2 than 
it receives from the less-expensive Vendor 1 offer.  
• Vendor 2 has a reputation for more thorough collection of 
data than Vendor 1 and Client values thoroughness more than 
the price difference.  
• Client has dealt with Vendor 1 before and expects to do so in 
the future even though, on this data, Vendor 2 has more 
accurate information.  
• Vendor 2’s data, while only needed for internal use by the 
Client, is obtainable in a more readily usable form than is the 
cheaper Vendor 1 information.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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These and a myriad of other factors go to defining what value the 
potential client may receive from the particular transaction and how 
the client may decide to purchase or not contract for purchase. A 
similar matrix exists with respect to the value the vendor desires or 
can obtain from the transaction with the particular client. 
Overall, of course, these interactions define elements of the 
market for information. Markets are based on interactive choices 
influenced by numerous individualized factors. It is in the context of 
these choices and the markets they create that contract law and 
property law function.  
Value counts in commerce, but it also counts in law. One court, 
writing in 1952, commented about this analogy in the following 
terms:  
In a court of equity if that which complainant has acquired 
fairly at substantial cost may be sold fairly at substantial profit, 
a competitor who is misappropriating it for the purposes of 
disposing of it to his own profit and to the disadvantage of 
complainant cannot be heard to say that it is too fugitive or 
evanescent to be regarded as property.16  
We could debate the question of what constitutes “property,” but 
that debate is not relevant here. It is relevant that law and the 
protection or preservation of value are often intertwined. Law in this 
context focuses on “protected value.” This result does not mean that 
in every case where value may exist law should provide protection 
for that value or a means of enhancing it. What it does mean, 
however, is that in any such case, protection is properly considered 
along with questions about the potential effects of denying protection 
or granting it on broader social policy issues.17 Where value in fact 
 
 16. McCord Co. v. Plotnick, 239 P.2d 32, 34 (Cal. App. 1952) (internal quotations 
omitted). I am not arguing that the application of property or misappropriation concepts in this 
case, or for present, in any other case, represents appropriate law or law appropriate for today’s 
economy. The point centers solely on the style of analysis.  
 17. See, e.g., Fred Wehrenberg Circuit of Theatres, Inc. v. Moviefone, Inc., 73 F. Supp.2d 
1044 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (company that used Web-posted information of another company 
relating to motion picture showing times did not commit misappropriation of the data where 
there was no proof that defendant’s actions would alter the other party’s incentive to post the 
information); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987 (C.D. Cal. 
2000). 
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exists, the ordinary response in law is to recognize that some right 
exists to preserve that value as against at least some intrusions and, 
ultimately, the law recognizes the right to contract (or decline to 
contract) with reference to that value.  
In defining rights associated with any asset, a balance must be 
drawn between granting rights to one party and withholding some 
limited rights in order to benefit the public.  
One could visualize a future world in which proprietary rights 
expand to the point that they stifle important public access and uses, 
leading to adverse effects on general welfare. We are not near that 
point today. The idea that formulating public policy entails adjusting 
to a tension between proprietary and public use provides a framework 
for most theoretical literature on intellectual property. How law and 
policy will eventually draw this balance in the information age is 
important. But we cannot ignore the fundamental reality that 
balancing occurs in a market context. Thus, in gauging the effect of 
property rights, the influence of the market, and the relevance of 
values associated with other than intellectual property rights cannot 
be ignored. 
Sources of value and wealth are shifting. The means of 
distributing value, and the threats to that value, are also shifting. In 
this context, it is difficult to conceive of an approach that establishes 
a priori restrictions on commerce and restricts markets in 
information, except in the very broadest terms. Stagnant markets and 
stagnant economies are characterized by rigidity based on prior 
practice. Dynamic markets are characterized by vibrant change and 
fluidity. The computer information economy epitomizes a dynamic 
market. It is important that this dynamic market not be constrained 
for reasons suited to an older or a stagnant economy. 
Transactions in Information, Not Goods 
Our focus is not property law, but rather transactions and law 
associated with transactions. To understand the market impact of 
licensing, it is important to understand the subject matter and nature 
of a license. On this issue, a significant disconnect exists between 
analyses that begin with an intellectual property framework and 
analyses that begin with a commercial transactions framework. 
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Those who come to licensing law issues from a perspective that 
begins with intellectual property law have no difficulty understanding 
that licenses concern information and informational rights. The issues 
from their perspective center on two questions. First, can a 
contractual license even exist without an underlying intellectual 
property right to be licensed? Second, are there situations in which 
freedom of contract should be closely hemmed in by public policy 
limitations related to information assets?18  
A group of academic writers advocate the view that informational 
property rights should be narrow in order to increase the public 
domain of information unencumbered by property rights. For many 
of these academics, a corollary to this property-rights policy argues 
that the ability of a person to exploit information assets contractually 
should be similarly hemmed in to avoid circumventing the sought-
after narrowed nature of the property rights.19 Of course, the 
contemporary pattern in reference to informational property rights 
entails expansion, rather than restriction. This expansion 
demonstrates that many disagree with this academic narrowing 
theory. While the academic literature often comes from one school of 
thought and urges limitations, judgments grounded in real world 
markets often lead in a different direction which confirms and 
protects the rights of a property owner to control markets for its own 
property. Thus, for example, the Ninth Circuit decision involving the 
Napster system for distributing music on a peer-to-peer (private party 
to private party) basis can be seen simply as repudiating the idea that 
information distributed in the market in digital copies loses its 
 
 18. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Tales that Article 2B Tells, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
931, 941 (1998). 
 19. See, e.g., Mark Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual 
Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111 (1998). When the world of policy making and 
commercial practice is expanded beyond that academic base, of course, this narrow view of 
appropriate policy is by no means the dominant contemporary philosophy. This lack of 
dominance is evident by the routine enforcement of contractual claims and positions in 
reference to intellectual property assets in which the contract terms do not correspond to the 
pure form of the copyright or other underlying property law statute. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (contract limits on uncopyrighted database); DSC 
Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(licensee not the owner of a copy); MAI Syss. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (license restriction to personal use enforced); Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer 
Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993) (contract). 
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character as protected information.20 More to the current point, the 
Ninth Circuit in that case flatly rejected an argument that copyright 
owners did not have the right to decide for themselves how their 
property would be used in the digital marketplace for their own 
works.21  
Instead of handing this market over to others based on a claim to 
narrow property law rights, the court simply held that the persons 
who placed their copies of the music on the system for access by 
others and those who “accessed” the works violated the owner’s 
copyright. The difficult issue was to what extent Napster, the system 
facilitator, could be held responsible for the infringements, a topic 
that goes beyond our present inquiry, but which was generally 
resolved in favor of the property owners. 
In contrast to the focus from an intellectual property law 
perspective, those who discuss licensing from a perspective that 
begins with a commercial contract framework often wrestle with 
issues like: what is the subject matter of licenses; what contract 
formation rules govern; and what warranty or other characteristics 
should exist in a license.22 Most commercial lawyers and academics 
were schooled in an environment in which commercial contracts 
centered on goods and real estate transactions. That background 
shapes their perception and frames some of their concerns about 
transactions in information.  
One point of contention entails the mistaken belief by some, that 
computer information industries deal in goods. These industries do 
not deal in goods. Their focus is not on tangible property. They deal 
in information and transactions in intangibles. The software and 
digital information industries do not deal in goods any more than the 
book publishing industry sells paper. The software and digital 
information industries do not deal in goods any more than the music 
recording industry deals in plastic. The software and digital 
information industries do not deal in goods any more that the motion 
picture industry deals in celluloid tapes.  
 
 20. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 21. Id. at 1017 (citation omitted) (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Naptster, 114 F. Supp.2d 
896, 915 (N.D. Cal. 2000)).  
 22. See, e.g., RAYMOND T. NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW ¶¶ 11.09-11.25 (1996).  
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In each information industry, the value sought and obtained by the 
transferee lies in the intangibles and the contractual right to use them. 
Tangible media, like paper, plastic, celluloid, CD, may serve as a 
conduit, but that is all. Indeed, after loading the information into a 
computer, many simply discard the diskette. The tangible items do 
not define the product even if the transaction involves delivery of 
information in the form of a tangible copy.  
That fact has great importance because, for information or 
services, the policy balance and competing commercial and social 
demands placed on the subject matter are entirely different for 
services than for goods. We traditionally treat providers of 
information or of services differently than sellers of goods. We do 
that not because of arbitrary tradition, but because what the 
information and services industries provide is different than goods 
and relates differently to how our economic and social systems 
function. Indeed, based in part on this difference, one frequently finds 
First Amendment issues raised in reference to software and other 
digital information systems, whereas such issues would seldom be 
considered in reference to the regulation of hard goods transactions.23 
The fundamental focus of an entire economy does not often 
change, but when change occurs, there is a predictable reactionary 
response. In reference to law, that response insists that the new 
economy must be viewed in terms of the past and that changes should 
be reversed or restrained by law in order to retain the formerly 
comfortable patterns. That response is wrong, impractical, and 
ultimately, untenable.  
It argues, or assumes, that nothing changed when, in fact, much 
changed. It asserts that law should act to preserve old economic 
patterns, rather than allow the economy to embrace new patterns. It 
asserts that law should regulate to stop change when the function of 
transactional law should be to promote and support a burgeoning 
economy that benefits all participants, including consumers. It, like 
those who argue for restricting the ability to license in the mass 
market, argues from a position of fear; even though we are in a world 
 
 23. See, e.g., Universal City Studios v. Corkey, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (source code 
is within the First Amendment); Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000). 
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of growth and expansion where the positive benefits of change for 
everyone, including consumers, are evidenced daily. 
Sixty years ago, Karl Lewellyn denounced lawyers, legislators, 
and regulators of that time who thought in terms of the prior 
economy, rather than focusing on the new economy and its subject 
matter.24 He was describing a change in the United States from an 
agrarian economy to a manufactured, mass-produced goods 
economy. Over several decades, his arguments eventually resulted in 
the adoption of the current Article 2, a creature of the sales of goods 
economy and a law specifically tailored to deal with sales of 
manufactured goods. Were he alive today, Lewellyn would argue just 
as strongly against treating licensing of contemporary digital 
information under rules developed decades ago for sales of goods. In 
our era, those same arguments led to the promulgation of UCITA. 
Our economy is dominated by transactions in intangibles. It is a 
fundamental mistake to view word processing software as equivalent 
to a toaster, or a transaction to create a multi-media product as 
equivalent to one to manufacture refrigerators, or an online access 
contract as equivalent to buying a car, or to equating most other 
digital information contracts to purchases of manufactured hard 
goods. These transactions differ in many fundamental ways and call 
into play entirely different social values, marketplace dynamics, and 
opportunities for a vibrant, diversified, and responsive marketplace. 
A number of early courts held that some transactions involving 
computer software should be handled under contract law relating to 
the sale of goods.25 Most of these decisions involved cases where 
computer hardware or other goods predominated in the transaction. 
The courts used standard Article 2 analyses to hold that the entire 
transaction should be brought into Article 2 because goods 
dominated. Contrastingly, in cases dealing with software alone, 
 
 24. See Karl Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARV. L. REV. 873, 876 
(1939). 
 25. See, e.g., Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D. N.J. 
1979), aff'd, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980); Synergistic Tech., Inc. v. IDB Mobile 
Communications, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 24 (D. D.C. 1994); Neilson Bus. Equip. Ctr., Inc. v. Italo 
V. Monteleone, M.D., P.A., 524 A.2d 1172 (Del. 1987) (turnkey hardware and software system 
was contract for goods); Design Data Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 503 N.W.2d 552 (Neb. 
1993). 
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decisions split on what law governs.26 When one reviews case law on 
licensing information generally, most cases hold that sale of goods 
law does not apply to informational assets and the vast majority never 
mention Article 2 at all.27 After years of independent debate and 
discussion involving diverse interest groups, two different uniform 
state contract law projects separately concluded that software 
ordinarily should be treated differently than goods. U.C.C. Article 9 
treats software as a general intangible.28 UCITA develops a separate 
body of contract law applicable to transactions in computer 
information.29  
Because of intense political lobbying in Article 2 revisions against 
this position, it is not clear whether any proposed revision of U.C.C. 
Article 2 (if one ever emerges from an eleven-year project) will 
maintain that position even though, for over eight years, both 
sponsoring groups for Article 2 expressly adopted the view that 
computer information was not equivalent to goods. The revisers may 
recede from that position under political pressure and leave the issue 
unanswered in the statute to satisfy those who fear reality. The choice 
on that issue ultimately does not matter because the reality remains 
that informational assets and transactions in them entail far different 
considerations than do transactions in ordinary goods. 
The issue is hardly debatable under federal intellectual property 
law. There, the Copyright Act makes an explicit distinction between 
the tangible item and the informational rights involved, a distinction 
that is also adopted in UCITA.30 Transfers of a copy do not transfer 
 
 26. See Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991) (goods); 
Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (not goods); DSC 
Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Article 
2 analysis not applied; licensee not owner of a copy of a computer program).  
 27. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Through the Looking Glass: What Courts and UCITA Say 
About the Scope of Contract Law in the Information Age, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 255 (2000); see also 
William B. Tanner Co., Inc. v. WIOO, Inc., 528 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1975) (license for vocal and 
instrumental recordings to be used on the air not a "transaction in goods" within Article 2); 
Snyder v. ISC Alloys, Ltd., 772 F. Supp. 244 (W.D. Pa. 1991); Rosenstein v. Standard & Poor's 
Corp., 636 N.E.2d 665 (Ill. App. 1993) (data license not goods). 
 28. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(44) (2000). 
 29. UCITA does not redefine goods. Instead, it takes the more direct approach of simply 
describing computer information and computer information transactions and making those 
subject matter subject to the contract law rules of UCITA. See, e.g., UCITA §§ 102, 103 (2000). 
 30. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1994); UCITA §§ 501, 502. 
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the copyright as a matter of both federal and state law. Similarly, case 
law on intellectual property rights issues associated with computer 
information treats licenses and computer information assets as 
different in kind from goods and sales transactions. Thus, although 
Article 2 states that title to goods passes on their delivery to a buyer, 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that a licensee of 
software does not own the copy of the software delivered to it where 
the license restricts use of the software in a manner inconsistent with 
ownership of the copy.31 Because of that ruling, and others consistent 
with it, the licensee’s right to use the software depends on the 
contract terms. That federal law principle is identical to the rule 
adopted in UCITA which provides that, in a license, whether the 
licensee obtains title to the copy used to deliver the information 
depends on the terms of the license.32 Here, it is Article 2 that is 
mismatched to the underlying transaction and the law applicable to it 
since, in a sale, Article 2 mandates that title to the goods passes to the 
buyer no later than on delivery of the goods.33 Of course, the fact that 
the Article 2 rule for sales of goods is not consistent with law 
applicable to licenses of information should not be surprising—a 
license is not a sale and the license contract focus is not on goods. 
In cases where the issue centers on warranties, whether there are 
implied warranties associated with the transactional subject matter 
often depends on whether, after the fact, a court treats the transaction 
as involving goods, services, or information. Under current law, in 
most states the Article 2 warranties of merchantability and fitness for 
a purpose apply only to sales and leases of goods. They do not apply 
to transactions in services or in information. For example, in Milau 
Associates v. North Avenue Development Corp.,34 the New York 
Court of Appeals refused to apply a U.C.C. warranty of fitness for a 
purpose to a contract to design and install a sprinkler system. Its 
rationale shows the underlying contract law that is involved here: 
 
 31. See DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999). 
 32. UCITA § 502. 
 33. U.C.C. §§ 2-401; 50. 
 34. Milau Assocs. v. N. Ave. Dev. Corp., 368 N.E.2d 1247 (N.Y. 1977). 
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[T]hose who hire experts for the predominant purpose of 
rendering services, relying on their special skills, cannot expect 
infallibility. Reasonable expectations, not perfect results in the 
face of any and all contingencies, will be ensured under a 
traditional negligence standard of conduct. In other words, 
unless the parties have contractually bound themselves to a 
higher standard of performance, reasonable care and 
competence owed generally by practitioners in the particular 
trade or profession defines the limits of an injured party’s 
justifiable demands.35 
Another New York court held that an online information service 
was analogous to a newspaper and that, unless it made an express 
commitment to do so, the service was not responsible for errors or 
misleading information that arguably caused economic loss to a 
subscriber.36 
There are parallel splits in case law focused on computer 
programs that turn on whether the court treats the transaction as 
involving goods, services, or information. Faced with the intricate 
policy and complex history on these issues, UCITA adopts warranties 
that parallel those for goods in all cases where the issue deals with 
functional aspects of computer programs, but protects and encourages 
distribution of informational content (e.g., text, images) under an 
entire set of policy considerations and different implied terms.37 
We live in a complex world that becomes more complex as 
informational assets move to the forefront as subject matter for 
economic exchanges. We cannot simply refuse to believe what our 
experience tells us. Information-based transactions deal with different 
sources of market value and with subject matter to which different 
policy perspectives traditionally apply. 
 
 35. Id. at 1250. 
 36. See Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 334 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987). 
 37. See UCITA §§ 402, 403, 404 (2000). 
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III. WHAT IS A LICENSE? 
A license is a contract. Its subject matter is information and rights 
in information. The contract gives rights to a licensee to use 
information or resources that the licensor controls or to which it 
controls access. License agreements also often cover issues 
concerning the quality, availability, and use of the information. 
If one analogizes licensing to commercial sales of goods, it might 
appear that warranties are the focus of license terms, since, especially 
in mass markets, this is a primary focus of most contracts. But 
licenses have far broader and very different functions than sale 
contracts. In many transactions, licenses entail complex agreements, 
while in others they merely waive the right to sue. In each case, 
however, the core of a license deals with contractual rights for use of, 
or access to, information and defines what the licensee receives.  
Definition and Assumptions 
UCITA defines a “license” as:  
[A] contract that authorizes access to, or use, distribution, 
performance, modification, or reproduction of, information or 
informational rights, but expressly limits the access or uses 
authorized or expressly grants fewer than all rights in the 
information, whether or not the transferee has title to a licensed 
copy. The term includes an access contract . . . .38  
Under this definition, a license authorizes limited or conditional 
access to or use of information.39 UCITA goes on to define default 
rules that flow from the creation of a computer information license. 
These are drawn from a blend of reported cases, modern practices, 
and policy judgments associated with existing commercial and 
 
 38. UCITA § 102(a)(41). 
 39. If one were forced to draw an analogy to the world of manufactured goods, a license 
resembles a lease more than a sale. The person who acquires the licensed information (or the 
leased car) does not own that information, but has certain rights to possess and use it. Those 
rights are defined by the contract. The analogy between a license and a lease breaks down, not 
because of the similarity of a license and a sale, but because the subject matter of a license is 
intangible and because a greater array of use-related provisions are common in licensing (either 
increasing or decreasing the licensee’s permission to use the information). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 99 Nimmer book pages  10/16/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
120 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 8:99 
 
 
intellectual property law. 
Does a license give an affirmative right to use technology or 
information along with assurances of its quality, or does it convey 
less? UCITA reflects a commercial perspective on the nature of 
licensing and assumes that, in many cases, such contractual 
assurances are given. However, it recognizes that trade practice and 
expectations of particular contexts may alter that assumption. Indeed, 
in most areas of patent licensing, no implicit assurances are given that 
using the licensed information may not violate third-party rights. The 
dominant common law view treats a license as entailing few if any 
affirmative commitments to the licensee and as not entailing any 
assurance that the licensee can actually use the licensed subject 
matter without infringing another’s rights. The following captures 
this view: 
[A] patent license . . . is in essence nothing more than a 
promise by the licensor not to sue the licensee . . . . Even if 
couched in terms of “[L]icensee is given the right to make, use, 
or sell X,” the agreement cannot convey that absolute right 
because not even the patentee of X is given that right. His right 
is merely one to exclude others from making, using or selling 
X.40 
While this quote refers to a patent license, a similar doctrinal concept 
applies to copyright licenses.41 
The traditional intellectual property view treats a license as 
nothing more than a covenant not to sue. There are sound reasons for 
this. For example, the property right created under patent law is a 
negative right (i.e., the right to prevent others from doing designated 
acts). The patent owner might be blocked from using its own patented 
technology because doing so would infringe the patent rights of 
another party. In patent licensing, the reality of the negative right 
carries over to characterize what ordinarily occurs in a patent license 
as equally negative: e.g., no conveyance of an affirmative right to use 
 
 40. Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr Stahlecker & Gill v. Schubert & Salzer, Maschinen-
Fabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1063 
(1988).  
 41. Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/6
p 99 Nimmer book pages  10/16/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002]  Licensing in the Information Economy 121 
 
 
the technology, but merely a promise not to exercise the right held by 
the patent owner. It is possible to expressly convey an affirmative 
assurance that the licensee can use the licensed technology, but under 
this viewpoint that assurance is not implied. This analysis was 
generalized to other types of licensing, including copyright licenses.  
The two perspectives (commercial and intellectual property) 
encompass conflicting conceptions about the nature of the 
transaction. In the one perspective, there is no affirmative assurance 
to the licensee that it can use the licensed subject matter. In the other, 
a licensee is presumed to have a right to use the information unless 
that right or the presumption is excluded by the agreement. 
Figure 1 
 
 
These conflicting perspectives reflect a fundamental dissonance in 
what constitutes the typical or presumed nature of a license 
agreement. This dissonance sets a context for very different default 
rules governing the meaning of the agreement where the parties do 
not otherwise indicate their intentions. The limited transfer presumed 
by the intellectual property law view of a license supports few, if any, 
implied obligations beyond the negative promise to not sue. The 
commercial conception of the transaction, on the other hand, 
encompasses a promised right to use the licensed technology and 
often, various presumed other obligations. 
Traditional common law approaches to license law hold that there 
are no assurances about the quality of the licensed subject matter. 
Unlike in commercial law, licensing law was, and largely remains, a 
field in which, in the absence of express assurances, qualitative issues 
about the subject matter do not exist. A doctrine of caveat licensee 
prevails. The idea that there are no implied warranties about quality 
reflects policies grounded in the reality that licensing practice often 
does not in fact assume that qualitative assurances are given and in a 
LICENSE 
I will not sue you for use 
You have a right to use 
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policy to avoid chilling distribution of informational assets by 
creating transactional risks associated with the quality or accuracy of 
the information.42 At most, the common law acknowledges some 
implied obligation in cases involving close relationships of reliance. 
There, the underlying assumption may be that the information 
provider will not act negligently. However, even that assurance 
seldom arises when the informational rights or content are distributed 
widely.43 
This common law viewpoint conflicts with the rules regarding the 
sale or lease of a good, in either the mass market or in commercial 
transactions, in which the buyer receives the benefit of implied 
warranties about the quality of the subject matter. Of course, except 
in some consumer contexts, the seller or lessor can disclaim these 
assurances by contract; implied assurances are waivable by 
agreement under Article 2.  
Licenses and Rights to Use 
Under either view (e.g., affirmative grant or mere covenant), the 
main function of the license centers on permissions or agreements 
associated with the use of or access to informational assets, along 
with a licensee’s promise not to exceed agreed limitations on use.44 
There are many variations on this theme. For example, while some 
software licenses allow unlimited types of uses, in others, the licensee 
agrees to use the software solely for consumer purposes. Some 
motion picture licenses permit public broadcast of the picture, while 
others permit only a non-public performance in the transferee’s 
home. Some recording licenses allow public broadcast, while others 
preclude that use and allow the licensee to make and sell unlimited 
 
 42. Warranty law differentiates between the paper or plastic and the information on it. The 
paper or plastic may be subject to goods-based warranties, but the information is not. We do 
not, in this country, impose a no-fault implied warranty on information and, indeed, in most 
states, there is no tort liability for inaccurate information. Instead, we treat information as a 
creature of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th 
Cir. 1991); Cardozo v. True, 342 So.2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). On the applicability of 
the First Amendment to software, see Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000) (First 
Amendment limits permitted regulation of distribution of computer source code).  
 43. See, e.g., Winter v. GP Putnam & Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 44. See, e.g., UCITA § 701(a) (1999 Official Text). 
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numbers of copies of the recording. 
The variety reflects the nature of the subject matter and the 
market. The variety is unlike transactions in goods where agreements 
deal with exclusive use, possession, or ownership of the tangible 
subject matter. Licenses, in contrast, deal with what uses are 
permitted. This question reflects the value that frames the transaction. 
Informational assets can be transferred and simultaneously retained 
by the transferor. In principle at least, an owner of a copyright or a 
patent can make an unlimited number of transfers (licenses) of that 
work while retaining the informational asset and otherwise exclusive 
rights in it. The owner of a tangible product, on the other hand, 
cannot both sell and retain it, nor can it lease and also retain the right 
to possession of it during the term of the lease. Transactions in goods 
are bound by the physical object, while transactions in information 
are bound by contractual terms associated with use of the intangible. 
In a transactional context, then, the relationships consist of 
information passed from one party to another, mediated by an 
agreement which defines and apportions the transferee’s right and 
limitations on use. The license defines the rights and, thus, defines 
the focus of the transaction and what value the transferee receives in 
a way that is simply not possible to replicate in the world of 
transactions in goods. 
One illustration of this involves the difference between an 
exclusive and a non-exclusive license. The difference in these two 
transactions depends on the terms of the license, but they are 
significantly different types of value for the licensee. In law, the 
difference lies in whether the licensor contractually commits to not 
grant further licenses of the same subject matter within the same 
scope as that conveyed to the transferee. If the licensor promises not 
to do so, the license is exclusive as to its stated scope and duration. 
UCITA makes this traditional concept explicit.45 In a non-exclusive 
license, the transaction does not give the licensee rights against 
anyone else, but merely a permission to use within the stated scope of 
the license. Reflecting this permission, general law assumes that a 
non-exclusive licensee lacks standing to enforce the copyright or 
 
 45. See UCITA § 307 (2000). 
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patent against third parties; that property-law right remains in the 
property-rights owner, the licensor or the person it represents.46  
Sales of copies of informational assets are more like non-
exclusive licenses than exclusive licenses. The buyer of a copy does 
not receive any commitment from the seller to not sell other copies to 
anyone it pleases. Sales are like licenses because, although the buyer 
acquires ownership of the copy, it obtains only limited rights to use 
the information on that copy. The copyright owner retains ownership 
and control of most uses of the information even with respect to the 
copy purchased by the buyer. The buyer of a book, for example, does 
not have the right to use the book to make and distribute multiple 
copies of the novel printed in the book. Indeed, the buyer has only the 
very limited right to resell its own copy, to discuss the book, rely on 
its context for advice, and to use the unprotected ideas in the book. 
Non-exclusive licenses are inherently pro competitive and pro-
distributive.47 The contracts distribute rights in informational assets 
that in law could otherwise be restricted in use or access to one 
person, the right’s owner. The license agreement makes them 
available in whole or in part for use by additional persons (the 
licensor and the licensee). The transaction granting another person 
the conditional right to use, or access, the information does not use-
up the information, which also remains in the hands of the transferor. 
Thus, licenses increase the licensee’s rights in or access to 
information. The extent of the increase depends on the terms of the 
agreement. The increase, however, leaves the licensor with the asset 
it held before the transaction.  
Legal Foundation for Licenses 
Licenses are common in the information industries. These 
industries use licenses for the flexibility, focus, and commercial 
benefits that licenses permit as compared to other transactional forms 
of conveying information. Since licensing is a long-standing practice, 
 
 46. See, e.g., In re Ortho Pharm. Corp., 34 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 47. See U.S. Dept. of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Guidelines for the 
Licensing of Intellectual Property, available at http:/www.usdoj.gov:80/atr/public/guidelines/ 
ipguide.wp5 (Apr. 6, 1995) [hereinafter Antitrust Guidelines]. 
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it is not surprising that a firm legal foundation exists for it—actually, 
there are many overlapping bases. 
The core legal foundation is grounded in the role of contracts in a 
free-market economy. The formula is simple. One party owns, 
controls, or knows something of value. Another party desires to 
acquire access to or use of it. The terms of the transaction, if any, are 
shaped by the market and the choices of the parties. They are 
implemented by a contract. The general rationale for enforcing the 
contract rests in sustaining a market economy and in the basic theme 
of U.S. law that agreements between and among parties should be 
enforced in the absence of abuse. 
Assuming that two parties make an agreement reflecting an 
exchange of value, is further legal justification required to enforce the 
contract? Ordinarily, the answer should be “no.” While there may be 
some cases in which public policy precludes certain contracts or 
contract terms, the core of mutual promises provides sufficient basis 
for enforcement. Some argue that further justification should be 
required. But that argument is not accepted in modern cases.48 In fact, 
quite the opposite. Many modern cases enforce licenses, even if the 
underlying subject matter is information involving no intellectual 
property rights at all.49 The few modern cases that decline 
enforcement typically do so because, in a particular case, contractual 
assent was not obtained or statute of frauds rules were not met, rather 
than because of any broad conceptual bar on licensing in any 
marketplace.50  
 
 48. Especially from 1950 until the early 1980s, some courts and federal agencies acted 
with distrust and hostility to the use of intangible property rights to leverage commercial results 
outside their scope. See ROGER B. ANDEWELT, TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AND THE ANTITRUST 
LAWS-THE VIEW FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & TECHNOLOGY LICENSING 401 (1982). 
However, no court during that period doubted that intangible property rights support licensing. 
Cf. Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 47.  
 49. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Rosenstein v. 
Standard & Poor's Corp., 636 N.E.2d 665 (Ill. App. 1993). This pattern is especially clear in 
reference to online licensing of access to information or other services. See, e.g., Caspi v. 
Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (holding that choice 
of exclusive forum enforceable in online contract); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., 47 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1020 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (finding online terms of service enforceable). 
 50. See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(holding that a shrink-wrap warranty disclaimer is not enforceable in a battle of forms); Klocek 
v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp.2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000) (finding that silent retention of the 
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As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals commented when 
presented with the question of whether a license could be enforced 
for information that was neither patented nor copyrightable, “a 
contract is a contract, our system of law assumes that contracts 
should be enforced in the absence of fraud, duress, criminality, 
unconscionability or similar problems.”51 Licenses of information 
serve important functions in the economy. There is no basis to 
preclude them where relevant contractual assent was obtained, and 
there are not clearly overriding public policies against a particular 
contractual term. 
Of course, many licenses involve information covered by 
intellectual property rights or held in a location controlled by the 
licensor. In such cases, additional factors provide a way of 
understanding the foundations for licensing. These relate to the 
licensor’s right in law to control access to or use of the relevant asset. 
Licensing in such contexts rests in part on the licensor’s right to 
apportion the extent to which it releases to another or reserves to 
itself control over or access to its informational assets. 
Information, Copies, and Retained Rights 
Copyright, patent, trademark and trade secret law, conceive of 
intellectual property rights in terms of preconditions which, if met 
with respect to particular subject matter, yield defined rights with 
respect to that subject matter. In copyright and patent law, these 
rights are described in statutes.  
• Copyright: Property rights attach to works of authorship 
without any governmental approval or registration. Such 
rights give an owner the exclusive right to make copies of the 
work, distribute copies, make derivative works from it, 
publicly perform the work, publicly display the work, and  
 
computer was not express assent to terms that sought to modify contract already formed 
between the parties where party did not have notice that contract terms would be presented). 
 51. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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publicly perform the work by means of a digital audio 
transmission.52 
• Patent: Property rights attach to specific claims that pass 
standards of inventiveness and utility resulting in the 
issuance of a patent by federal authorities. Property rights 
include the right to prevent anyone else from making, using, 
selling, or offering to sell the patented invention.53 
One can license any of the listed rights, while retaining control of 
the others. One can license or transfer such rights on an exclusive or a 
non-exclusive basis. Similarly, one can subdivide any of the rights 
through limitations in a license. One might condition any of the 
licensed rights on the performance of stated activities. These 
contractual choices comprise enforceable contractual distributions of 
the rights, unless they offend competition law or other fundamental 
limiting policies.  
We discuss later the market benefits that flow from the flexibility 
created by license agreements. For now, the important point is that a 
contract that grants one right (or a part of it) does not imply that any 
other right is granted under the license. Indeed, in the absence of 
other indicia of a broader agreement, a license conveys only what 
was expressly granted or what can reasonably be inferred from that 
express grant.54 There is no assumption that a transferor (rights 
owner) grants all rights except those it expressly withholds. In effect, 
information transactions are presumed to be limited conveyances, 
rather than comprehensive transfers and this is true whether the 
transaction entails a license or a sale of a copy. 
This corresponds to a policy of preserving and protecting the 
rights-owner’s control of its property in order to enhance incentives 
encouraging the creation of the informational asset. Both patent and 
copyright law are grounded in a policy to enhance this incentive. 
 
 52. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106 (1994). The last three of the listed rights are limited to 
particular types of works, but that limitation has no relevance to this discussion. Id. See 
generally RAYMOND T. NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW ¶1.05 (West Group, 1996). 
 53. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-04. See generally DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT (1999). 
 54. See, e.g., S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989); see also A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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Licenses that optimize a person’s value from the rights are fully 
consistent with this underlying property law policy. 
As a matter of fact, most transactions do not convey away all 
rights in information. Indeed, except when there is an express 
assignment of all rights, virtually all transactions in information are 
partial transfers at most. Ordinarily, the transferee is subject to 
substantial rights retained by the transferor. This fact is true in both 
the upstream market where information assets are created, modified, 
and developed, and in downstream mass markets. The idea of a 
limited rights conveyance under a license, in the context of this 
ordinarily conditional transactional framework, is thus neither 
surprising nor unusual. Indeed, the buyer of a book would be shocked 
to learn that it thereby purchased the copyright to the novel; the 
author and publishing house would be even more surprised by that 
result. 
This last point has significance for computer information 
licensing. Unlike a sale of goods, a sale of a copy of a copyrighted 
work or patented article leaves the buyer subject to restrictions in its 
use even with respect to the copy it acquired. Sale of a patented 
article exhausts only some patent rights with respect to that particular 
item.55 The buyer, for example, cannot examine the patented item it 
bought and use that information to make additional identical items. 
There are also patent law restrictions on the extent to which the copy 
owner can reconstruct and repair the machine without permission of 
the property rights owner. Similarly, an authorized sale of a copy of a 
copyrighted work leaves substantially all of the copyright owner’s 
rights intact and held by the copyright owner, giving the copy buyer 
only limited flexibility in that copy—chiefly to transfer it (except by 
rental for a computer program) and, with respect to computer 
programs, to make a back up and a copy or adaptation essential to the 
owner’s use. All other copyright rights remain in the copyright 
owner.56 The Copyright Act makes this explicit: 
 
 55. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 56. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1004; Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. 
Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 280 (4th Cir. 1989) (first sale does not give the buyer the right to 
make public performances; that right remains in the copyright owner). 
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Ownership of a copyright . . . is distinct from ownership of any 
material object in which the work is embodied. Transfer of 
ownership of any material object . . . does not of itself convey 
any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object; nor, 
in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of ownership of a 
copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey 
property rights in any material object.57 
This rule is repeated in UCITA as a matter of state contract law. 
UCITA states that:  
If an agreement provides for conveyance of ownership of 
informational rights in a computer program, ownership passes 
at the time and place specified by the agreement but does not 
pass until the program is in existence and identified to the 
contract . . . . Transfer of a copy does not transfer ownership of 
informational rights.58 
In effect, an authorized sale of a copy is best viewed as a form of 
license. In that license, the parties rely on first-sale or exhaustion 
doctrine to supply default terms about what the transferee receives as 
against the dominant intellectual property rights of the rights owner. 
If the transaction does not involve a sale, however, the uses granted 
and withheld are not affected by these default rules and, even when a 
copy is sold, it remains possible to alter them by contract. Under 
federal law, whether the person acquiring a copy becomes the owner 
of the copy depends on the terms of the contract and whether the 
contract places limitations on the person’s use of the information that 
are materially inconsistent with the rights given under a first 
authorized sale.59 The UCITA rule for licenses follows that federal 
law approach. 
In practice, some licenses increase, while other licenses decrease 
the use privileges that go to the transferee if the comparison is to a 
 
 57. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1996).  
 58. UCITA § 501 (2000). 
 59. See supra text accompanying note 58. See generally DSC Communications Corp. v. 
Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak 
Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Adobe Syss. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. 
Supp.2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
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first sale.60 Illustrations of each effect are common even in the mass 
market. In general, however, the uses enabled by a first sale are not 
the appropriate comparative measure for determining whether 
licensing expands or contracts a licensee’s rights. Rather, a license is 
simply one means by which the parties might agree to distribute and 
receive information or technology and rights to use it. Under 
copyright law, for example, if a copyright owner chooses to sell 
copies of its work without further conditions, the buyer at an 
authorized sale owns the copy and obtains the privileges defined by 
first-sale doctrine. But nothing in the law requires that the rights 
owner sell copies of its information, any more than the law requires 
the owner of a car to sell it. The copyright owner can offer its work in 
whatever framework it chooses. The success or failure of any offer 
depends on the market and the willingness of others to accept the 
proffered conditions. 
The proper measure of the effect of a license on the licensee or the 
licensor begins with the premise that the rights owner controls the 
property rights defined by statute. The license, if any occurs, reflects 
the parties’ bargain about the scope of the rights conveyed, the 
conditions on which they are given, and of course the price. 
Illustration 2 indicates a common context in which a license gives 
rights greater than a first sale in one respect, but less than a first sale 
in another respect. 
Illustration 2. Distribution License  
ABC licenses Digital to distribute up to 100,000 copies of the 
copyrighted software so long as the distribution meets stated 
conditions, including that any end-user must agree to a license 
with the ABC (publisher) to use it and that the license restrict 
the purchaser to consumer use of the program in the computer 
sold by Digital. The Digital license requires ABC to deliver  
 
 60. See Green Book Int’l Corp. v. Inunity Corp., 2 F. Supp.2d 112 (D. Mass. 1998) 
(shrink-wrap increases rights); Frontline Test Equip., Inc. v. Greenleaf Software, Inc., 10 
F. Supp.2d 583 (W.D. Va. 1998) (mass market license allowed unlimited copying, but 
prohibited commercial distribution). 
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one copy of the software and to license Digital to make and 
distribute 100,000 copies from that master copy. 
Illustration 2 depicts a transaction that is common in software and 
other digital information industries.61 In it, the copyright owner elects 
not to make, sell, or deliver copies for resale by the buyer, but to 
allow a distributor to make and distribute copies pursuant to a license. 
The publisher’s property rights include the exclusive right to make 
and to distribute copies. Thus, the distribution license gives 
conditional (often non-exclusive) permission to the distributor to 
make and distribute copies despite the overriding property right it 
holds. Making or distributing copies outside the agreed contractual 
scope breaches the contract and infringes the copyright.62  
The agreed terms in the license in Illustration 2 exceed any right 
to make copies that might arise from the “first sale” of a copy. Thus, 
the license goes beyond first-sale rights. On the other hand, the 
licensee’s right to distribute copies is controlled by agreed conditions 
focused on the purposes of the distribution, the requirement that the 
transferee agree to further terms, the location in which the end user 
can use the program, and the purposes of such use. These limitations 
as to a particular copy arguably comprise lesser rights given to the 
transferee than the right of a first-sale buyer to distribute its copy as it 
chooses. Neither difference, however, is particularly germane to 
examining the market effect of licenses of this type.  
The more relevant analysis centers on the fact that licensing 
enables tailored transactions and more efficient distribution. In this 
setting, the analysis centers on the options available to the parties. 
One way to understand the options would be to ask what would be 
the effect of a rule that precludes licensing and requires software to 
be distributed solely through a first sale of copies. The most obvious 
effect would be that a transaction involving delivery of one copy and 
a license to make additional copies would be foreclosed. Presumably, 
however, since the parties in the hypothetical (and in the real world) 
 
 61. See, e.g., In re DAK Indus., Inc., 66 F.3d 1091, 1094-97 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing 
and applying the Microsoft master copy distribution license in a bankruptcy proceeding). 
 62. See, e.g., Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(distinguishing between a covenant breach and a breach of scope provisions); Graham v. James, 
144 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1998); MAI Syss. Corp., 991 F.2d at 511. 
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opt for the single copy/license framework, their judgment was that 
this framework yields a net benefit to the transaction. The possible 
reasons why this might be so are apparent. The master-copy license 
eliminates costs associated with delivering and handling 100,000 
copies, including the risk that some copies may be lost or damaged. It 
places the cost of copying on the licensee, but in many instances that 
will be a relatively minor increment (e.g., where the copies are 
simply installed in the licensee’s hardware). Overall, there may be a 
net reduction in transaction-related costs with an overall benefit that 
is reflected in the agreed price. Whether that benefit exists in fact and 
produces an agreement to this form of distribution depends on many 
things, including from the licensee’s perspective, whether this 
publisher’s software is more desirable and offered on beneficial terms 
as compared to that of other licensors. 
Modern cases routinely enforce a copyright owner’s decision to 
license computer information, rather than merely sell copies, even 
when the information is delivered on a tangible medium.63  
Under the license described above, a distributor that makes or 
distributes copies in a manner outside the terms of the license 
breaches the contract and infringes the copyright.64 A distribution 
outside the conditions of the license is unauthorized. A transferee at 
an unauthorized sale or other transfer is not a buyer at a first sale, but 
rather possesses an infringing copy.65 As a result, in this framework, 
the end user’s right to make a copy of the software in its computer 
and otherwise to use the software depends on it being taken through 
an authorized distribution chain and, given the conditions imposed, 
on its having a valid license or other authorization from the copyright 
owner—the publisher.66 The unauthorized transfer gives no rights 
against the copyright (or patent) owner.67 
 
 63. See, e.g., DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 
(Fed. Cir. 1999); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d at 511; Adobe Syss. Inc. v. 
One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp.2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 64. See Adobe Syss., 84 F. Supp.2d at 1086. 
 65. See Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208 
(E.D.N.Y. 1994); Microsoft Corp. v. Grey Computer, 910 F. Supp. 1077 (D. Md. 1995). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Accusoft Corp. v. Mattel, Inc., 117 F. Supp.2d 99 (D. Mass. 2000) (holding no 
rights obtained by merged entity). 
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Ultimately, such cases reflect a principle mentioned earlier: a 
property right in informational assets gives the property owner, like 
any other property owner, a right to control the manner and form in 
which its property enters commercial markets. The copyright owner 
can allow transfers of its property in a “stand-alone” market or 
preclude that use or, much more likely, choose one means of 
distribution for uses in networked computers and a different means of 
distribution for stand-alone copies. One can trace the right to make 
market choices to the basic idea of property itself, which consists in 
part of the right to transfer or not transfer the property as one 
chooses. Indeed, in one recent case dealing with a different, but 
relevant issue, the court held that a company that made copyrighted 
recordings available to its subscribers engaged in indirect copyright 
infringement and not protected fair use.68 In effect, according to the 
court, the defendant was usurping a market that copyright law 
reserved for the copyright owner.69 
Embedded in this is a fundamental concept about the role of 
property rights in markets. The argument that the property owner 
should not complain because another party acts without permission 
strikes a hollow note in reference to most types of property law. A 
similar argument with reference to informational property should 
strike a similarly hollow chord. The existence of a property right 
implies the owner’s right to choose whether to distribute it, and under 
what terms distribution is offered. The market determines whether the 
offered terms are viable and influences or ultimately controls the 
 
 68. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp.2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 69. Defendant argued that plaintiffs had not shown that such licensing was “traditional, 
reasonable, or likely to be developed.” Moreover, defendant argued,  
its activities could only enhance plaintiffs’ sales, since subscribers could not gain 
access to particular recordings made available by MP3.com unless they had already 
purchased . . . or agreed to purchase, their own CD copies of those recordings. Such 
arguments . . . are unpersuasive. Any allegedly positive impact of defendant’s 
activities on plaintiffs’ prior market in no way frees defendant to usurp a further 
market that directly derives from reproduction of the plaintiffs’ copyrighted works. A 
copyright holder’s “exclusive” rights, derived from the Constitution and the Copyright 
Act, include the right, within broad limits, to curb the development of such a derivative 
market by refusing to license a copyrighted work or by doing so only on terms the 
copyright owner finds acceptable. 
Id. at 352. 
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owner’s choice. The initial choice, for better or worse, resides in the 
property owner. Nothing indicates that courts are better able to make 
and administer such marketplace determinations.  
In the Napster illustration mentioned earlier, if property rights 
owners determine, either because of market demand or because of 
desired financial gain, to support the peer-to-peer file-exchange 
system, they will implement that decision through licensing, rather 
than merely selling copies. One approach would be to license a 
service to operate such a system (indeed, one publisher made that 
agreement with Napster). Another would be to license directly 
(online one presumes) individuals to participate in peer-to-peer 
exchanges. The other alternative would be to offer to mass market 
purchasers of copies a license to distribute copies on a peer-to-peer 
system.  
The court in Napster held that each individual copy owner that 
made its copy available on the system and each individual person that 
downloaded a copy infringed the copyright.70 A license could 
authorize such use. A copyright owner will presumably make such 
licenses available if it believes that the net benefit to it of offering the 
licensed copies at a price the market will bear exceeds the net loss it 
suffers from authorizing the making of additional copies of its 
property, or if it believes that offering such licenses will reduce a net 
loss that would otherwise occur. Numerous empirical and judgment 
factors go into resolving that question, including a judgment about 
whether the market will pay the price demanded for a license to do 
something that cannot be done by the owner of a copy. The Napster 
case, however, stands for the proposition that, as a matter of law, the 
decision to offer that choice rests entirely in the copyright owner. 
In a format in which the mass market marketing choice is a 
license the license will often involve either a so-called shrink-wrap 
contract, or a click-screen agreement under which the terms of the 
license and the request for assent to it are presented on the computer 
screen when the prospective licensee first uses the work. Both types 
 
 70. Id. at 353. In the actual case, there were a limited number of publishers/performers 
that authorized this type of distribution or, at least, were not objecting to it. But that does not 
change the illustration which presumes an absence of such acquiescence. 
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of license are generally enforced under ordinary contract law.71 Under 
UCITA, they are enforceable only if the licensee had reason to know 
that they would be presented and the licensee affirmatively assents to 
the license.72  
Putting contract formation questions aside, what is at stake here? 
The end user does not ordinarily deal directly with the publisher. The 
publisher, however, controls the copyright. The function of the 
publisher’s license is to establish the direct license between the 
publisher and the end user. An enforceable license validates the 
distribution and establishes the end user’s rights to copy and 
otherwise act with respect to the digital information as allowed in the 
license. An unenforceable license leaves the end user in possession of 
an unauthorized distribution and no right to use the software. 
The functions of an end user license then are different from that of 
a manufacturer’s warranty in sales of goods. In the distribution of 
goods, the sale to the distributor and the subsequent resale give the 
eventual buyer all rights to use the particular goods; indeed, the buyer 
obtains complete ownership. In contrast, the end user license 
represents the only authorization by the property rights holder that 
allows the end user’s intended use of the digital information. It is a 
direct, necessary contractual relationship, rather than a mere warranty 
commitment or disclaimer. 
A license implements property rights permissions to end users (or 
other persons contractually acquiring a license) in return for a price 
that is either paid directly to the publisher or indirectly to an 
 
 71. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (contract 
enforceable; limits use of database to consumer purposes only); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 
F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding contract requiring arbitration enforceable based on use of 
computer without objecting to contract terms); M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline 
Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803, 808 (Wash. 2000) (holding license to be enforce when it 
followed purchase order: “Reasonable minds could not differ concerning a corporation’s 
understanding that use of software is governed by licenses containing multiple terms”); Mgmt. 
Computer Controls, Inc. v. Charles Perry Const., Inc., 743 So.2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) 
(holding that forum selection clause in shrink-wrap license enforced); Rinaldi v. Iomega Corp., 
1999 WL 1442014 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999) (holding conspicuousness of disclaimer not affected 
by fact it was delivered in shrink-wrap format); Lieschke v. Realnetworks, Inc., 
2000 WL 198424 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (The court did not dwell on enforceability, but assumed it. 
The license was displayed as a precondition to installing the software by the user who 
downloaded the software.). 
 72. UCITA § 208 (2000). 
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intermediary, such as the retail store at which a copy is acquired. The 
justification for licenses in the mass market or, indeed, elsewhere 
using such distribution chains, lies, in part, in the fact that they enable 
an efficient means of offering differentiated products to the mass 
market. The efficiencies lie, in part, in avoiding the need to 
individually negotiate each license with the potentially millions of 
individual licensee-purchasers who desire to acquire the licensed 
rights. Instead, the options can be presented at an appropriate price 
and participants in the market can choose to accept the terms or not. 
Both sides benefit by reduced acquisition or transfer costs and by the 
fact that parties can choose the product they desire based on price and 
usefulness to them.  
For example, a publisher might offer two products distinguished 
by the terms of the license. Product 1 may be the latest musical 
recording hit contained on a digital copy sold without any license for 
$20.00. Product 2 may be the same record licensed with the right to 
engage in peer-to-peer exchange for $35.00. Which product succeeds 
in the market depends on whether (or how many) licensee-purchasers 
are willing to pay $15.00 for the additional right to engage in peer-to-
peer exchanges. That decision might be affected by the scope of the 
additional rights offered. Regardless of the market result, however, 
both sides benefit from standardization of contract terms since, unless 
the publisher is expected to simply give up its property right, the 
alternative would involve negotiation costs that would be distributed 
in the form of additional prices. It might, for example, cost a 
company $5.00 to ascertain and acknowledge the consumer’s choice 
by telephone or e-mail and this knowledge would elevate the costs of 
the two products to $25.00 and $40.00 respectively.73  
This is an illustration of mass customization that defines one of 
the opportunities involved in modern computer-information markets 
and in which it can be said truly that the license defines the product in 
ways not present in other types of products. That a licensor might 
misjudge the market or that some people simply ignore the law and 
 
 73. It should be obvious that, while the numbers might change, this negotiation cost 
would continue to be present even if the publisher only required those who desire the additional 
rights to call (or mail) and request to pay for them or, in the alternative, only those who do not 
desire the rights to call (or mail) to request that they be deleted in return for a refund.  
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the contract cannot be said to detract from the positive effect that the 
transactional framework has in actual markets. Thus, in the example, 
a purchaser that does not desire the rights is not required to pay to 
subsidize others to acquire rights to participate in Napster-like 
distributions. The purchaser not wanting distribution rights can 
acquire the lesser-cost product.  
Similarly, the purchaser-licensee is not required to subsidize the 
cost generated by those who desire to negotiate the license (sale or 
broader authorization); those costs are avoided by a low-cost, highly 
efficient means of offering the alternatives without person-to-person 
negotiation. A rule that requires that these costs be incurred raises the 
price of the product and, in some cases, will force prospective 
purchasers into a position of being unable to pay or simply unwilling 
to make the purchase. That result adversely affects any social interest 
in enhancing and encouraging the actual distribution of informational 
assets because it takes some people out of the purchaser market. 
In this distribution method, some risk might exist that a purchaser-
licensee inadvertently acquires the wrong package of rights, or might 
be tricked into doing so. Cases involving misled purchaser-licensees 
are readily solved under ordinary misrepresentation law and 
deceptive trade practices laws. In fact, there are no reported case law 
instances of such cases in software distribution. 
The risk of mistake deals with the information available about the 
transaction. A prospective purchaser-licensee will make rational 
choices if it knows its options. Some purchaser-licensees may not be 
aware of their options or may inadvertently choose the wrong one. 
How often this mistake will occur has never been shown, nor has any 
showing been made about the costs that result. On the other hand, it 
is clear that this risk exists in all markets; there is an established body 
of law to deal with it. Thus, if a consumer acquires a toaster believing 
it to be a five slice machine, but in fact it is only four slices, the 
resolution of the problem depends on a variety of factors, including 
why the consumer had a mistaken belief and, in fact, whether the 
consumer had that belief. 
One could argue that the risk of mistake means that license 
practice should be banned in order to avoid the costs of mistakes. To 
sustain that argument, however, the advocate should be required to 
show that the costs to the few who make mistakes are not offset by 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the potentially large economic and personal choice benefits to the 
many who make unmistaken choices. One should also have to show 
that the loss to the federal property-rights owner (e.g., effectively 
telling it that the property right has been usurped) do not exceed the 
benefit of preventing mistakes by mandating that products cannot be 
differentiated based on how they might be used. Ultimately, the 
burden would be to show that on net, the social benefits of the 
practice do not exceed the social costs of mistake. That argument has 
never been made or effectively supported. Perhaps understanding 
this, courts consistently enforce such contracts.  
UCITA addresses the information and mistake issue in several 
ways in the mass market. 74 In UCITA, the purchaser-licensee is 
guaranteed advance notice (reason to know) and the ability to rely on 
the express agreement (if any), an opportunity to actually review the 
terms before assenting, and a right to a refund of any payment made 
if the terms do not conform. In that regime, most if not all cases of 
actual mistake are readily resolved without disrupting what is a 
socially beneficial practice. 
Online Access Contracts 
With the advent of the Internet, massive amounts of information 
are provided through online access systems, many of which use a 
framework under which contractual permission, described as an 
“access contract,” is required to enter and use the information 
resources.75  
 
 74. UCITA §§ 112, 208, 209 (2000). It provides for rules including the following: 
The license terms cannot contradict the express agreement of the parties (e.g., they 
cannot take away what was actually promised). 
The license terms are not enforceable unless the licensee has reason to know that they 
would be presented (e.g., the licensee must be engaged in a transaction where it has 
reason to know that terms will control its use). 
The license terms are not enforceable unless the licensee has an opportunity to review 
them before assenting and, if it declines, a right to a refund of any amounts paid for the 
information. 
The license terms must be presented no later than the first use of the computer 
information. 
Id. 
 75. The term, “access contract,” comes from UCITA and is defined in the following 
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An access contract is a license that grants the licensee a right to 
access a computer or similar information-containing system. In an 
access license, the value offered does not depend on whether the 
information is protected by copyright or patent law. The value arises 
from a license: the access provider controls a system and its content 
and agrees to permit another person to use that system under stated 
conditions. The right to control unauthorized access to a computer is 
grounded in several areas of law and in simple technological or 
physical control; it does not depend on intellectual property. 
Reported cases enforce online licenses when assent is properly 
obtained.76 The case-law approach is consistent with standards set out 
in UCITA (e.g., there must be a clear manifestation of assent to the 
terms with reason to know assent is being inferred and occurring after 
having had an opportunity to review them).77 If an opportunity to 
review the contract or if a manifestation of assent to it did not occur, 
the contract may be unenforceable.78 If the contract is unenforceable, 
however, that leaves open whether the user’s access to and use of the 
information was authorized or whether it constitutes trespass, 
infringement, or even a criminal act.79  
Access licenses deal with numerous issues. Among the most 
important are those concerning when and under what conditions 
access is allowed and defining the permitted use of information 
obtained from the site. In effect, these contract terms define what 
product the system provider offers (e.g., “access for consumer use”) 
and what value the licensee obtains. The information in the system 
 
manner: “‘Access contract’ means a contract to obtain by electronic means access to, or 
information from, an information processing system of another person, or the equivalent of such 
access.” UCITA § 102(a)(1) (2000). 
 76. See, e.g., Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1999); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020 (N.D. Cal. 1998) 
(enforceable); Rudder v. Microsoft Corp., 1999 Carswell Ont. 3195 (enforced); Jessup-Morgan 
v. Am. Online, Inc., 20 F. Supp.2d 1105 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (enforced); Groff v. Am. Online, 
Inc., 1998 WL 307001 (R.I. Super. 1998); DiLorenzo v. AOL, 2 ILR (Pike &Fisher) 596 (N.Y. 
S. Ct. 1999); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); In re RealNetworks, 
Inc. Privacy Litig., No. 00 C 1366, 5 ILR (Pike & Fisher) 3049 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 77. See UCITA §§ 208, 112 (2000). 
 78. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1344 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
 79. Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998) (lower court enforced 
online license; appellate court held that either the license barred the conduct or there was no 
license to prevent claim of infringement). 
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may be copyrighted, but the primary value that frames the contract 
lies in the access provided on a conditional basis.  
From their earliest emergence, access contracts were recognized 
as a new way of distributing information which presents market and 
other issues unique to their own circumstance. Thus, in 1996, the 
U.S. Office of Technology Assessment commented: 
[E]lectronic dissemination—unlike printing—does not involve 
the publication of copies. As a consequence, copyright 
ownership is transformed from the right to reproduce a 
copyrighted work in copies for sale to the right to control 
access to the copyrighted work for any reason. [When] 
copyright is applied to works that are electronically 
disseminated, the balance between the rights held by the 
proprietor and those retained by the public is changed.80 
In these contracts, access, instead of or in addition to intellectual 
property rights, forms the value-base for making the contract (that is, 
what the licensor offers and what the licensee decides to acquire). 
Analogies to print publications and sales of printed copies provide 
little insight for this market context or for what, if any, legal restraints 
might be placed on providers of information in this format. This is a 
new method of distribution with its own market characteristics. 
 
Consider the following illustrations: 
Illustration 3. NYT Online  
NYT website offers articles and other information about 
current events at cost to the user. It requires a party entering 
the site to agree to terms before accessing the site by a click on 
an on-screen button. The user has access to the terms before 
agreeing. The agreement allows use only for non-commercial 
purposes, allows reading but not copying or distributing, and 
disclaims warranties of accuracy. 
 
 80. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF 
ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 204-05 (1986). 
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Illustration 4. Consumers’ Union Online 
Consumers’ Union Web site allows open access to a public 
part of the site, but requires agreement to terms and conditions 
of use for a person to access the reports portion. Agreement is 
indicated by a click on-screen. One contract term precludes the 
user from using the reports for commercial advertising.  
In both illustrations, the terms and conditions are licenses. The 
licenses enable creation of a diversified system that makes a strong 
positive contribution to the modern economy. By contractually 
regulating use, copying, and quality commitments, these contracts 
allow the providers to make available a new resource in the mass 
market. The consumer benefits are enormous. Contracting for access 
is a form of commerce that could not exist in paper-based media.  
Online licensing or distribution systems often do not involve static 
databases and the industry involves many different formats.81 
Methods of delivery are constantly changing. The line between 
services and information products is no longer clear; it is blurring.82 
In the modern context, the decision to provide software or other 
computer information by online access, by delivery of tangible 
copies, or by a right to access remote functionality is a marketing 
decision driven by market factors. Systems that do not deliver 
tangible copies are increasingly used. 
What are the contractual attributes of an access license? Express 
contract terms control. In the absence of express terms, there is little 
case law on what are the implied obligations of the parties. UCITA 
provides some guidance. Under UCITA, the vendors must provide 
access with a reliability consistent with similar contracts in the online 
 
 81. In many cases, publishers of other computer information make information and 
functionality available online pursuant to licenses. Even more significant, one of the directions 
in which many believe that the software industry will move in the near future consists of 
making the functionality of software available primarily by remote access to online systems 
which can be accessed by low cost systems on the customer's end. Under this approach, the end 
user licensee will not receive a copy of the program, but a contract right of access to, and use 
of, the software. The software remains on a remote computer. Again, at least in part, the legal 
basis for such contracts rests in the provider’s right to control access to its own information and 
systems and in the force and effect of contracts made in an open economy. 
 82. DAVIS & MEYER, supra note 1. 
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industry.83 The obligation necessarily varies depending on the 
context: time sensitive, real-time data systems have higher 
obligations of accessibility and reliability than historical databases 
with no immediacy considerations involved.  
UCITA also deals with what default rule applies for permitted 
uses of information obtained from the access. Section 611(3) states:84 
“Unless it is subject to a contractual use term, information obtained 
by the licensee is free of any use restriction other than a restriction 
resulting from the informational rights of another person or other 
law.”85 This premise uses intellectual property rights as the baseline 
in the absence of express contract terms. Thus, if the information is 
not copyrighted or otherwise subject to intellectual property rights, it 
may be freely used unless the agreed license places express 
contractual restrictions on use. If express contract terms are 
established, they govern unless they violate a fundamental public 
policy of the state.86 
Some may see the issue as whether, in the absence of intellectual 
property rights in the accessed information, any contractual 
restriction should be permitted on use of the information once it is 
accessed. However, where adequate value sustains the creation of a 
contract, the obligations and limits undertaken by contract should be 
enforced unless public policy reasons exist to vitiate the premise that 
agreements are and should be enforceable. UCITA, for example, 
provides that a court may invalidate a contract term if that term 
conflicts with fundamental public policy that, in the context, 
outweighs the fundamental policy of enforcing contracts.87 As this 
indicates, there may be a need to balance interests. Most often, 
however, contract limits on use serve important commercial interests 
and do not impinge on any conflicting fundamental public policies. 
These terms should be enforceable.  
Should a consumer testing agency be allowed contractually to 
prevent its subscribers from using test results to comment publicly on 
 
 83. UCITA § 611 (2000). 
 84. UCITA § 611(a)(3). 
 85. Id.  
 86. UCITA § 105(b). 
 87. UCITA 105(b). 
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the evaluation of their own products or those of competitors? If the 
answer were grounded solely in copyright law, the governing rule 
might be that copyright law does not give exclusive rights in facts 
and, thus, does not support the restriction, but that it does not 
preclude such a restriction under other law or under contract.  
One could argue that copyright law reflects an affirmative public 
policy that factual information (e.g., the results) cannot be protected 
from use and disclosure:88 the negative rule under copyright law 
(“facts cannot be copyrighted”) could be viewed as an affirmative 
public policy that use of facts cannot be restricted in any manner. 
This view has no case law support in reference to contractual 
relationships.89  
The contrary theory is that the customer agreed to the contract as 
part of the value given to the licensor (or the restriction required by 
the licensor) to obtain the value of access to the information. This 
generally establishes an enforceable contract. The relevant issue is 
whether contract law enforces the particular term. Under UCITA, that 
question would be addressed in terms of whether a court should bar 
enforcement of the term because the term conflicts with fundamental 
public policy outweighing the fundamental public policy of enforcing 
valid contracts.  
The proper answer, ultimately, is that a contract term does not 
ordinarily conflict with and is not overridden by any policy in 
copyright (property) law about property rights in published facts.90 
Copyright law establishes property rights enforceable against any and 
all other persons with respect to the subject matter. Even if copyright 
law embraces an affirmative policy that no property rights can exist 
in published facts, it preempts only state laws that provide property 
 
 88. It is doubtful that this bare statement would be made since it has long been recognized 
that a proper claim of trade secrecy can be established with respect to information, including 
information that would not be protected under copyright law (e.g., facts). In the online case, 
however, we are involved in a situation where the information is made available to members of 
the public who subscribe to the service. This situation might challenge the ability to make any 
assertion of the type of confidential relationship ordinarily required to create a valid trade secret 
claim.  
 89. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (no preemption of 
contract claim); Register v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp.2d 238 (S.D. N.Y. 2000).  
 90. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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rights equivalent to copyright.91  
But contracts are agreements and are not equivalent to property 
rights; they are enforceable only as between the contracting entities. 
Indeed, copyright law and all other forms of property presume that 
contracts will be made and enforced with respect to their subject 
matter and that these contracts will add to or subtract from property 
rights as between the parties to the agreement. 
IV. MARKET EFFECTS AND CHOICE 
The impact of licensing and of any associated property rights 
cannot be assessed without accounting for the market in which 
licensing and information rights function. In the marketplace, 
practices that offer significant efficiencies or other benefits should 
not be restricted without strong cause to do so. Licensing readily fits 
into that category of efficient transactional forms.92 
One fact emerges when one examines contemporary distribution 
of information: the information economy entails a vibrant diversity 
which creates a richness in what and how information, technology, 
and services can be obtained by consumers and businesses. Licensing 
contracts contribute to diversity in a way that could not be 
accomplished without this transactional format. The context in which 
this occurs is complex. We can begin to understand aspects of it, 
however, through Figure 2, which reduces the complex context to a 
limited framework consisting of three tiers or levels of decision 
regarding whether to distribute the information, how to do so, and 
what transactional format to use. 
 
 91. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994). 
 92. On the other hand, it must be made very clear that it is not true that a practice (or a 
property right) should be permitted in law only if it is proven to have positive impact in the 
market. Any such standard concedes too much to theory and regulation, without allowing the 
dynamics of the actual market to flourish. In effect, such a rule would place too much weight on 
our limited understanding of how markets and law interact. In a market economy, the 
fundamental means for distributing value lie in the actual market comprised of actual 
transactions and other interactions in which different approaches are tested and accepted or 
rejected by the market. Indeed, some of our most accepted methods of doing business while 
supported by law, cannot be shown clearly to have positive economic impact in theory. See, 
e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Truth About Secured Financing, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1437 (1997) 
(economic benefit not proven); Steven L. Schwartz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured 
Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425 (1997). 
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Figure 2 
 
Figure 2 depicts choices from the perspective of the licensor 
(transferor). It is thus incomplete. It may imply that the licensor’s 
unilateral choices control, but that is not the case. In many of the 
options in Figure 2, effectuating the licensor’s choice in distributing 
the information requires a contractual interaction with other persons 
(transferees) in a given marketplace. If potential transferees do not 
value or desire the distribution method and cost chosen by the 
transferor, no transactions occur unless the transferor alters its 
choices. Markets are not one-way streets, but are defined by 
exchanges. 
Decision Whether to Distribute 
A person who controls information may elect not to distribute the 
information, but to hold the information entirely to itself (Tier 1 in 
Figure 2). Unless mandatory disclosure laws govern, the law protects 
that decision. Indeed, tort and criminal laws protect the information 
owner against unauthorized intrusions inconsistent with its decision 
about whether to distribute and how to distribute its informational 
asset. The right to refuse to distribute (license or sell) is recognized 
Tier I (whether)
Do Not Distribute Distribute: To Public  Distribute: Restricted Group
Tier III (format) 
Sale of Copy License  Confidential Disclosure 
Tier II (how) 
Gift: Release Rights Conditional Distribution  Sale: Assign All Rights 
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even as a defense to various forms of antitrust liability.93 It is a 
byproduct of the property right itself.  
A decision not to distribute information places the person outside 
the market and tends to exclude the information from that 
marketplace and from the public. This choice is the option against 
which other market choices, including licensing, must be compared. 
One policy of copyright and patent law is to encourage creation and 
dissemination of information. In Figure 2, achieving that objective 
can be seen as a matter of how law affects when a person will choose 
to distribute, rather than to hold the information itself.94  
An individual or company will distribute its information if, 
accounting for costs, the person believes distributing the information 
will yield greater value than not distributing it. Value and costs need 
not refer to monetary gain or loss. Many writers freely distribute on 
the Internet because they obtain personal value and satisfaction from 
peer reactions without receiving any monetary compensation. Just as 
often, people write secret diaries and artists conceal their art for fear 
of public rejection and to preserve their own satisfaction with it.  
Law plays a role, but that role is limited because of the many 
personal and contextual variables involved. For example, law cannot 
control some issues such as whether anyone desires to hear about or 
to purchase the information the owner desires to distribute. That 
being said, law might contribute to encouraging or discouraging a 
decision to distribute the information as compared to holding it secret 
 
 93. See, e.g., In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000); 
Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 94. It should be obvious that the structure discussed here also pertains to decisions about 
“creating” information assets at the outset. Thus, arguably, a person will be less likely to 
undertake the task of writing a book if at the end of the day there will be no ability to control 
distribution of the work or to obtain financial benefits from the distribution. Similarly, 
expensive motion picture projects will be less likely to occur if the developer of the work 
knows that the completed motion picture can be freely appropriated by anyone who chooses to 
do so. On the other hand, of course, the book or movie, once created, may serve as a basis for 
work by subsequent persons, thus establishing the peculiar circle that arises in reference to all 
forms of property law: creating protected rights benefits the current rights owner, but creating 
too strong of rights may impinge on the creation of subsequent value by other parties. See 
Wendy Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 
78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992); Edmund Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable 
Information, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 683 (1980). In this Article, we have dealt with transactions, 
rather than property law, and I will leave that issue for another time.  
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and close to the licensor’s vest.  
In general, law encourages distribution if it reduces costs to the 
information holder and increases the owner’s perceived likelihood of 
return value if it elects to distribute. In both respects, of course, as a 
matter of policy, one must draw various balances in allocating risk, 
reward, and opportunity for future use. There is a core philosophical 
question here: should choice be dictated by statute or regulation, or 
should law enable the market to define this balance, subject only to 
exclusions against grossly abusive practices. Ordinarily, in a 
transactional (market) environment, statutes, regulation, and judicial 
enforcement of limitations are less effective than market choices. The 
ultimate decisions are best left for the marketplace. This is especially 
true in a situation where information about products (information 
products or products of other types) is rapidly and broadly available, 
as is true in the Internet era.  
Liability risk 
Law encourages an information-holder’s decision to distribute 
information by reducing liability risk for the information provider or, 
by allowing the information provider by agreement to control or 
exclude the liability risk. In contrast, to the extent that law creates a 
liability risk not controllable by agreement, it creates incentives not 
to distribute the information. Obviously, in some cases, the policy 
balance may accept such disincentives as a price to be paid for 
achieving other social goals, but that should be true only if the goals 
and the likelihood of their achievement is are clear and outweigh the 
goal of encouraging distribution.  
In sales of goods law, numerous cases and statutes examine the 
balance between manufacturers, distributors, and customers on issues 
of liability. The net result is that one group of rules exists for liability 
for mass market goods, and a different risk allocation framework is 
permitted for goods distributed other than in the mass market. The 
liability rules arise under contract and tort law, including products 
liability law. They generally require the mass market distributor of 
consumer goods to assume risk of causing personal injuries by a 
defect in its product when it places goods into the stream of 
commerce, but do not require that the manufacturer assume the 
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unavoidable cost of compensating a transferee for economic losses 
resulting from defects in such goods.95 Allocation of risk for 
economic losses can be governed by contract terms. 
For information, different rules are appropriate and followed in 
case law. In general, the policy rationale for placing liability on an 
information provider is less than that for a manufacturer of goods. On 
the other hand, in public distributions of information policy limiting 
liability that would otherwise discourage distribution of information 
is supported by more substantial public policies associated with 
encouraging free speech.96 This balance differs from that in reference 
to mass market goods and shapes current law. For example, the 
Restatement (Third) of Products Liability holds that information is 
not a product under product liability law and, thus, not subject to the 
nondisclaimable, strict liability rules of that area of tort law even for 
cases where defective information causes personal injury.97  
Dealing with contract law UCITA sets three different implied 
warranty obligations in reference to digital information transactions. 
In each case, UCITA permits an agreed disclaimer or limitation of the 
implied obligation. The three obligations are: (1) a rule of no implied 
warranty liability for informational content distributed to the general 
public; (2) an implied obligation of reasonable care for accuracy of 
informational content distributed to a client in a special relationship 
of reliance; and (3) an implied warranty of merchantability for 
computer programs.98  
UCITA enacts the idea that the implied quality commitment for 
the functional aspects of computer programs should be measured 
under standards ordinarily associated with transactions in goods. 
Precedent links the character of the software provider’s implied 
obligations to a court’s determination of whether the contract is 
predominantly for goods, services, or information. UCITA holds that 
functional products are subject to an obligation of merchantability 
which, as is the case under U.C.C. Article 2, can be modified by the 
 
 95. See, e.g., E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delavel, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986); 
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443 (Ill. 1982). 
 96. See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 19 (1998). 
 98. See id.; UCITA §§ 403, 404 (2000). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/6
p 99 Nimmer book pages  10/16/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002]  Licensing in the Information Economy 149 
 
 
parties’ agreement. 
The other aspects of the UCITA implied warranty structure are 
important. They distinguish between published informational content 
and informational content provided in a special relationship of 
reliance. As indicated in Figure 2, a decision to distribute information 
is not an all-or-nothing event. The information holder can distribute 
information broadly (publish it) or narrowly (limited groups). 
Liability for generally published content is narrow or non-existent 
unless expressly undertaken by the agreement of the parties. The 
rationale for this stems from First Amendment concerns and the goal 
of encouraging broader, rather than narrow distribution. 
Beyond implied warranty (or default) rules, cost allocation 
involves the ability of the parties to control cost (liability risk) by 
their agreement. Laws that support an agreement on risk allocation 
encourage distribution. For sales of consumer goods, modern law 
holds that placing dangerously defective goods into commerce 
exposes the manufacturer to liability for any personal injury 
regardless of contract terms; in contrast, law generally does not create 
an unavoidable exposure for economic loss.99 The focus on personal 
injury and the creation of liability without a right to control the risk 
by contract represent a tailored response to public policies associated 
with distribution of mass-produced consumer goods.  
Flexibility 
Law should encourage decisions to distribute information. This 
occurs to the extent that it supports choices and flexibility in how an 
information owner can distribute information. Law discourages 
decisions to distribute information to the extent that it confines or 
narrows the choices available.  
Transactional flexibility gives the information owner a greater 
ability to tailor its distribution to fit its goals and its own assessment 
of how to obtain optimal value. Of course, such individual decisions 
may not create for the actor the results it desires. To limit choice 
because a person may make a mistake makes little sense practically, 
 
 99. See, e.g., All-Tech Telecom, Inc. v. Amway Corp., 174 F.3d 862 (7th Cir. 1999); 
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. SEC Donahue, Inc., 679 N.E.2d 1197 (1997). 
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conceptually, or philosophically. It suggests paternalism and control 
not acceptable in an open society. 
A decision to distribute information requires a prediction about 
future events. The decision will not always be correct. We talk here 
about personal choices, not abstract, perfect decisions. An individual 
or company making choices on how to distribute information may 
make an incorrect choice, misjudging the market, the personal or the 
legal and practical effect of its choice. Yet, the possibility of error is 
not relevant. Errors do not detract from the general premise: 
supporting the ability to make choices based on the owner’s 
knowledge and discretion enhances the likelihood it will choose to 
distribute. Personal choices by market participants are more likely to 
positively influence behavior than are a priori judgments of 
regulators with no direct market involvement or after the fact 
judgments of courts. 
Simply put, legal support for personal choices about how to 
distribute information will encourage the distribution of information. 
On the other hand, it could be argued that giving information holders 
the right to choose allows them to arbitrarily impose conditions 
inconsistent with intellectual property law. That argument 
incorporates a fallacy about both property and contract law. The 
fallacy assumes that the information holder’s choice is unfettered 
unless constrained in law. The reality is different. Choices are 
cabined in by the market and the responses that potential transferees 
make. The reality is easy to portray if an author or publisher 
“chooses” to sell copies of a digital book, only if the buyer pays 
$10,000 per copy and agrees to not re-transfer the copy, no mass 
market will exist for that product if the ordinary market for digital 
books involves a much better alternative, i.e., purchases for $11.00 
with a right to re-distribute the copy. Decisions or choices in a market 
are never unilateral if the party making the choice desires to 
contractually benefit from its decision.  
Contract terms can be imposed unilaterally only if the terms are 
acceptable to a sufficient number of purchasers. Terms must be 
considered in light of the value they expect or if no reasonable 
alternatives exist for a necessary product, including the alternative of 
foregoing it. A rational information holder faced with market 
rejection of its offer to distribute its work will either withdraw the 
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work or alter the terms for distribution. 
Licenses enable an array of opportunities to tailor distribution in a 
manner that, when tested in the market, gives a flexibility beneficial 
to both the transferor and the market of transferees. There are 
contract terms or practices that should not be permitted in a market 
context. These, however, are largely defined in antitrust law. 
Method of Distribution 
If a person decides to distribute her information assets, she may 
license it, sell (assign) all her rights for a price or may give the 
information away.100 The availability of licensing does not mandate 
either choice. The choices are governed by personal values, costs, 
and judgments about contextual opportunities. For example, an 
academic that conducts research on a topic may personally decide 
that publishing the results in an academic journal is the most 
personally valuable use for it. Alternatively, an academic may decide 
to sell the data to a third party. The person who desires the personal 
benefits of free public dissemination is not likely to feel influenced 
by the fact that, were it to so choose, it could license its results for a 
fee. 
Between the extremes of giving away or selling the information, 
there are various options that release some rights. These options rely 
on contract terms to define what is given and what is withheld or 
what use limitations are imposed. A decision to make a conditional 
distribution can be implemented under various transaction 
frameworks–e.g., sale of a copy, license, confidential disclosure to a 
few people.101 Of these alternatives, the benefit of licensing is best 
seen in the fact that it allows a distributor to tailor the distribution 
according to the market. For example, licensing permits a price that is 
supported by the market according to the person’s perceptions. 
One illustration of the interaction between contract terms and 
market choices involves the “free-software” or “open-source” 
movement. Here, the premise of this near-religious movement is that 
software made freely (1) available without use restrictions, (2) with 
 
 100. See supra Figure 2, Tier II.  
 101. See supra Figure 2, Tier III. 
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access to the source information, and (3) allowing modification of the 
software contributes to the social good in a way that software 
distributed with proprietary use restrictions cannot. Yet, in the most 
common form of this type of distribution, the distribution method 
entails the assertion of strong copyrights and a licensing system. As 
the preamble to one prominent “free-software” licenses states: 
To protect your rights, we need to make restrictions that forbid 
anyone to deny you these rights or to ask you to surrender the 
rights. These restrictions translate to certain responsibilities for 
you if you distribute copies of the software, or if you modify it 
. . . . We protect your rights with two steps: (1) copyright the 
software, and (2) offer you this license which gives you legal 
permission to copy, distribute and/or modify the software. 
Also, for each author’s protection and ours, we want to make 
certain that everyone understands that there is no warranty for 
this free software. If the software is modified by someone else 
and passed on, we want its recipients to know that what they 
have is not the original, so that any problems introduced by 
others will not reflect on the original authors’ reputations.102 
The license to which this quote refers limits copying and 
distribution of the software in a way that implements free software 
concepts. The user can use the software but cannot require payment 
for further licenses of the product or claim proprietary restrictions on 
the transferee other than the open-source terms. It cannot however, 
distribute the software or derivatives of it other than under a license 
that gives the licensee a right to modify, use, and distribute the 
software without use restrictions other than those placed on the first 
licensee. 
As this use of licensing indicates, the transactional option of a 
conditional transfer of rights to use information permits a wide 
variety of transactional frameworks suited to different transactional 
objectives. As a practical matter, however, an information owner 
offers information as a product defined by a license, but the license 
success is based on the response of the market. Sustainable 
 
 102. GNU General Public License, ¶ 1 (2001), at http://gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html#SEC2. 
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distinctions in products depend on whether they attract positive 
market response. A producer may desire to distribute its information 
under a license requiring a fee for each use of the product, but that 
desire goes for naught if the market rejects it. In essence, the 
producer might offer value of a particular type for a given price, but 
if the market regards the cost or terms as excessive or less desirable 
than alternative products, the product fails. 
Information assets placed into a market are subject to market 
restraints just like any other asset. While a copyrighted or patented 
work might be unique unto itself, in the market it competes with 
potential substitute information products.103 It is true, of course, that a 
work governed by a copyright or a technology covered by a patent 
cannot be duplicated without permission of its owner, but that falls 
far short of proving that licensing and other distributive choices are 
not affected by the market. For example, the impact of a copyright 
owner’s choice to sell copies of a history book about Abe Lincoln for 
$100 per copy is affected by the existence of another book on Abe 
Lincoln offered for $10. All other things being equal (e.g., author 
reputation, quality of writing and research, availability of copies), the 
market should favor the $10 book. The fact that the $100 book is 
copyrighted does not matter. Other things being equal, a database of 
animal images priced at $1 per access will succeed if competing 
against a similar database priced at $100 per access. Whether market 
success is affected by the fact that one license allows only non-
commercial use, while the other allows multiple copies also depends 
on the market demand. Similarly, a patent on a specific technology 
does not prevent, but may in fact induce, development of technology 
that works around or circumvents the patented technology. The 
likelihood that this result will occur hinges in part on how or whether 
the patent owner makes its technology available by license.  
There is more here in reference to computer information assets 
than other assets. In computer information transactions, the capability 
to tailor products by contract or technology to fit given markets is 
amplified because the tailoring does not require physical modification 
of the asset. An automobile, once built, can be significantly modified 
 
 103. See ANDEWELT, supra note 48. See generally NIMMER, supra note 8, at ¶ 7.05. 
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only with skilled effort and physical changes in the asset. A digital 
database, on the other hand, carries within it the capability to alter its 
utility to react to a different market demand. While some distinctions 
lie in the information itself (e.g., a horror movie as compared to a 
love story), even for identical information, differentiation occurs 
through license terms,104 technology controls,105 and the ability to 
deliver similar information in different ways. These distinctions, 
when made, are market-based choices. Some succeed, while some 
fail, but the process of differentiation is what is important. 
Myth of First Sale, Reality of License 
Licensing yields a richly textured environment in which market 
options abound. The diversity is created in part by contractual terms 
that differentiate among transactions in the same or similar 
information.  
One trap embraced by those who resist the idea of licensing is that 
they adversely contrast this diverse environment against a fantasy 
world in which information and technology is distributed solely by 
selling copies or machines with resulting statutory or common law 
first-sale rights going to the buyer. There are two myths at work here. 
First, the one myth is that sales are the mandatory method by which 
most information is transferred. Second, the other myth is that a sale 
leaves information unencumbered while licenses inherently limit 
rights. 
Market Choice and First Sale 
As to the first myth, few authors, motion picture producers, 
libraries, or software developers should believe it. Many mass market 
publishers today sell copies not because the law mandates they do so, 
 
 104. See, e.g., DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 
(Fed. Cir. 1999); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Frontline Test 
Equip. Inc. v. Greenleaf Software, Inc., 10 F. Supp.2d 583 (W.D. Va. 1998).  
 105. Technological controls shape the scope and nature of uses of, or access to, 
copyrighted and other types of information products. This control was recognized in the Digital 
Millenium Copyright Act with the exception of some uses that qualify as fair use under 
applicable copyright law. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1998).  
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but because the world of print and analog information believes that 
this way is the optimal way to distribute in the mass market.  
As indicated in Figure 2, the fact that some owners distribute by 
selling copies is due to market choices, not legal mandate. No laws 
bar Blockbuster Video or the local library from renting copies of 
works as long as rental does not violate the property owner’s 
copyright.  
The myth that the sole way in which information was made 
available in the 1960s and 1970s was through so-called “first sales” 
of copies in the mass market is wrong. Even before the digital 
information revolution and the advent of the Internet, various 
distribution systems existed. In addition to much information made 
available for free (e.g., given away), these included: 
• Television and radio broadcasts done under license 
from the rights owner; 
• Cable television subscription contracts that allow 
selective access to shows; 
• Motion picture theater performances based on licenses 
and ticket purchases; 
• Library procedures allowing check-out and loan of a 
copy; 
• Video store rentals of motion picture cassettes and 
other works; 
• Background music provided in public locations under 
license 
Information distribution in this country has always been diverse. 
With the advent of digital systems and the Internet, that diversity 
mushroomed. 
First Sale: A Sterile Transaction 
The second myth is that a sale of a copy gives less encumbered 
rights than a license. In fact, the first-sale doctrine is a legislative 
statement of limited privileges that a buyer receives if the rights 
owner authorizes sales of copies of its work and does not seek other 
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agreed contractual conditions for the transfer. It is effectively a 
license (a conditional grant of limited rights) created by statute and 
characterized by default terms. These default terms can be altered by 
the parties to the transaction by using a different type of transaction. 
The doctrine does not apply where the rights owner restricts the terms 
of a transfer of a copy or a patented machine, and this restriction can 
occur in a manner inconsistent with the idea that it authorized a 
simple sale.106 But more importantly, a sale of a copy is a sterile, 
limited transaction which cannot accommodate the numerous ways in 
which productive markets beneficial to consumers and businesses 
might be established.  
Some academic literature creates an aura around a first sale. They 
imply that the first-sale doctrine is associated with the First 
Amendment while licensing circumvents the First Amendment. Even 
those who articulate this argument must understand the fallacy of 
their position. First Amendment concepts affect both sales and 
licenses because First Amendment concepts create background law 
for the information economy. To the extent that it applies, the First 
Amendment prevents any improper use of governmental controls to 
restrict or regulate speech. In cases of abuse, First Amendment 
concepts directly restrict some contract terms or, at least, indirectly 
define policy restrictions on contracts.107 These are not first-sale 
issues and they are not cut-off by licenses. The First Amendment is 
fundamental U.S. law, not an encapsulation of first-sale concepts. 
The first-sale concept only provides that a buyer can distribute a copy 
(or do other designated acts) without infringing the copyright. 
Whether a contractual term in a particular contract is invalid under 
 
 106. See, e.g., DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 
(Fed. Cir. 1999); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The latter 
case dealt with application in patent law of a doctrine similar to the first-sale doctrine in 
copyright law. In patent law, the concept refers to “exhaustion” of the patent rights by an 
authorized first sale. But the conceptual premise and the court’s approach in each case is 
consistent. By authorizing only a restricted or limited transfer of rights, the copyright or patent 
owner and the transferee are not governed by first-sale concepts as a matter of property rights 
law. 
 107. For a discussion of this, see UCITA § 105(b) official cmt. UCITA is the first uniform 
law that expressly recognizes the right of a court to invalidate a contract term if the court finds 
that the terms offends fundamental public policy and that this policy clearly outweighs the 
policy of enforcing contracts. 
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the First Amendment or related public policy has nothing to do with 
first-sale. 
First-sale doctrine and its parallel in patent law (patent exhaustion 
law) are sterile concepts in that they engage only a narrow, defined 
set of privileges for the buyer. They involve conditional transactions, 
but without the potential for rich diversity that licenses offer. They do 
not give the transferee–buyer full rights in the information as 
compared to a license. Indeed a first-sale is, in itself, a form of 
license under which the transferee-buyer receives limited privileges 
in the copy while the copyright or patent owner retains most rights. 
This statutory distribution of privileges occurs if the rights owner 
elects to sell a copy and not to seek agreed restrictions on use of the 
information contained in that copy or to offer agreed expansions of 
the rights that come from a sale. First-sale is in fact a narrow and 
limited doctrine. 
To understand this, consider what an authorized first sale does not 
give to the buyer. First, an authorized first sale does not transfer the 
copyright or patent. The copyright or patent owner retains most of the 
rights in its information. Second, an authorized first-sale does not 
give the buyer the right to modify or make multiple copies of the 
work. Third, an authorized first sale does not give the buyer the right 
to publicly perform the work. 
The sale of a copy of a book merely gives the buyer of a book the 
ability to transfer that book to another person. A similar doctrine 
gives the owner of a copy of a computer program the privilege to 
make a copy or an adaptation essential to its own use, to make an 
archival copy and to transfer its copies to another person, as long as it 
does not also retain a copy, without being charged with 
infringement.108  
While there are more public policy issues here, they have little to 
do with the first-sale doctrine. Instead, they deal with the social 
policies surrounding for transfers of information in the mass market. 
In the print and analog recording industries, the sale of a copy to a 
mass market buyer carried with it no further contractual terms 
regarding use of the information. That sterile transfer was never 
 
 108. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1994). 
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mandated by statute. It arose simply because of ordinary business 
decisions. In effect, in transactions where parties do not make other 
agreements about use, first-sale doctrine provides a statutory, 
standard-form license. Because its terms are narrow, however, both 
transferees and transferors (licensees and licensors) often modify the 
terms of distribution.  
A transaction that merely sells a copy of information leaves the 
buyer with limited rights. The buyer does not have the right to make 
or distribute copies, publicly perform the work or, in the case of 
computer programs, to rent the work. In many cases, however, 
transferees prefer different rights, either greater or lesser, for 
commensurate payment. That is true in commercial markets and mass 
market transactions. The function of a license in either context is to 
establish that different allocation of rights and privileges to suit the 
market. There are many reasons for a consumer to seek different 
rights than those under a first-sale if those different rights are offered 
under a license.  
A sale of a copy is one way to distribute digital information. 
However, an unrestricted sale stands in stark contrast to the various 
contractual arrangements which might benefit both publishers and 
end users. In commercial markets, differentiation by contract has 
long been recognized as an appropriate procedure. In the debates over 
UCITA some large companies sought to preclude that option and 
require a transaction that in all cases presumptively exceeds the rights 
given by a first sale by allowing an unlimited number of 
simultaneous users of a copy. That argument, even if not preempted 
by federal law, would require property rights owners to increase the 
cost of ordinary licenses.  
For example, assume that the price at which software is offered by 
its publisher is gauged by +100 based on a reasonable assessment of 
the market and cost for each use term indicated below. Also assume 
that a consumer values the software based on the value to it of rights 
important to it and that the prices of the publisher correspond to the 
consumer’s valuation. The various rights or limitations that might be 
given in a transaction include: 
1. Use only for consumer purposes; 
2. Use only for business purposes; 
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3. Make up to five copies for simultaneous use; 
4. Make more than five copies for simultaneous use; 
5. Transfer the original copy without retaining a copy of it; 
6. Distribute copies made from the original;  
7. Publicly display or perform the work. 
8. Right to make a back-up copy. 
In this context, an unrestricted sale of a copy requires a +400 price 
(use for consumer purposes, use for business purposes, right to 
transfer the copyright to a back-up). Other combinations that might 
be achieved by a license yield different prices. The price of obtaining 
the software with all of the above-indicated rights is +800. 
Consumers are harmed by a rule that requires sales of copies. For 
a consumer, the ability to use the software for business purposes has 
no value so paying for that right is paying for a useless right. But 
under a first sale, such payment is required if we presume that there 
are no restrictions on the use of the work. In most cases, a buyer does 
not obtain value from a right to transfer its copy of digital 
information if he cannot also retain a copy. A rule that requires 
copies to be sold without restriction pursuant to a first sale forces the 
consumer to pay for +400. A license giving the buyer the right to use 
a work for consumer purposes would only cost +100. If a buyer does 
not desire the business use or transfer right, he must pay an additional 
+200 for rights he does not desire.  
Would requiring a sale of a copy benefit a business transferee? In 
most cases, the business purchaser is also disadvantaged. The 
business purchaser must pay for consumer uses (which he does not 
desire). Also, since a sale does not give him a right to make multiple 
copies, the business user must make numerous additional purchases 
to obtain sufficient copies to allow multiple simultaneous users. In 
contrast, a license for multiple users based on a delivery of a single 
copy eliminates the costs involved in multiple purchases.  
Licenses provide a transactional framework that can be tailored to 
suit the individual needs of the parties and allow for pricing that 
reflects those needs. Thus, for example, in the foregoing illustration, 
the cost of a right to make a consumer use is not likely to be the same 
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as the appropriate market price for a license to make a business use or 
to make and allow use of multiple copies. Indeed, this fact makes the 
benefit of licenses even more pronounced for consumers. A software 
publisher that seeks a consumer market might reasonably price 
licenses to fit that market (e.g., to permit consumer use only). This 
market would give consumers access to the information at a cost far 
lower than if the publisher would be required to average out prices 
for consumer and business uses in each transaction that it conducts. 
There are a much larger number of possibilities, but the point 
remains the same. Licensing gives computer information markets the 
opportunity to arrive at suitable prices and terms that may optimize 
distribution to all participants and value to the publisher. 
In large part, the debate over licensing in the mass market centers 
on two complaints. First, licenses (as compared to sterile sales) will 
be used to stifle rights to comment about, examine, and exercise free 
speech rights with respect to information distributed in the mass 
market. Second, licensing, rather than selling, has no economic 
justification, but represents an attempt by publishers to control and 
exact financial gains from their market. 
Both views are demonstrably wrong. License agreements are the 
manner in which a different permitted range of uses can be efficiently 
established. We have already discussed an illustration of this 
situation. There are many other illustrations.  
Illustration 4. Consumer Product 
Publisher creates a digital work that appeals to consumers and 
to commercial entities. Rather than distributing the work 
online via an access license, publisher distributes it in copies in 
a retail market. The work contained in each copy is identical. 
Some copies however, are subject to a license that restricts use 
to “consumer purposes,” while others are subject to a license 
that permits commercial use. The consumer licenses are made 
available for $10 each, while the commercial licenses cost 
$10,000.109 
 
 109. One might express concern about consumer fraud (paying $10,000 for a work that is 
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As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized in Pro-CD, 
Inc. v. Zeidenberg,110 being able to make such price and product 
differentiations creates benefits for consumers. A consumer can 
obtain an attractive information product for a fraction of the cost he 
would otherwise be required to pay. A first sale would not permit 
contractual differentiation based on use. Only a single price could be 
charged because all products would have the same use conditions. As 
a result, consumers would pay a substantially higher price. The 
license here efficiently establishes a basis to differentiate prices based 
on type of intended use. 
Of course, the publisher could offer a different product. It could 
strip out the “commercial” features of the product and offer to 
consumers at a low price a minimal version with functions limited to 
those perceived as useful to consumers, i.e., limited functions that 
justify the low price. That would create a market differentiated by the 
actual functionality of the software, bringing into play all of the 
inefficiencies associated with similar differentiation in sales of goods. 
It would also yield fewer software features for consumers, a result 
that most consumers do not want.111 The license differentiation 
allows publishers to offer feature-rich products to consumers, 
discerning between customers and basing prices on contractual use 
restrictions.  
Consider Another Illustration 
Illustration 5. Database Software 
Publisher develops database processing software. It distributes 
the software (1) by allowing it to be accessed and downloaded 
 
subject to a consumer-use-only license). That risk is like any risk of fraud in the modern 
marketplace and is met by various statutes, regulations, and common law rules giving remedies 
for fraud. Also, when UCITA is adopted nationally, it will provide a direct response to this 
problem. Under UCITA § 209, the terms of a mass market license cannot alter the terms 
expressly agreed to between the parties. An agreement to provide a commercial use license is 
not overridden by a consumer use license. See UCITA § 209 (2000).  
 110. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 111. Ben Z. Gottersman, Software, PC MAG., July 2000, at 201. (“PC Magazine readers 
don’t like watered-down software. In our survey, respondents tend to prefer more advanced 
tools to simpler and less feature-rich alternatives.”). 
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from Publisher’s Web site, or (2) through distributors who 
distribute the software in copies. In both contexts, some 
distributions are licensed for “educational uses only,” while 
others permit “commercial or any other use.” The license fee 
for educational use is $1,000, while the general (commercial) 
use license fee is $75,000. The software is identical. 
Again, differentiation based on the terms of the license enables a 
price and product differentiation that permits the publisher to respond 
separately to two active markets and therefore allows end users to 
acquire software capability tailored to their needs. In fact, major 
online databases have made this distinction for years, with huge 
savings to educational users. On the other hand, a simple first sale 
would alter both the marketplace and the price of the software.  
The ability to enforce the use restriction comes from both contract 
law and intellectual property law. As the court in Adobe Systems, Inc. 
v. One Stop Micro, Inc.,112 observed, if a person acquires software 
under an education use restriction but violates that restriction in 
making or distributing copies of the software, copyright infringement 
occurs. 
The foregoing illustration involves licenses that restrict the end 
user’s rights in a manner that prevents uses that would be permitted 
in an unconditional first sale. One cannot reasonably argue that these 
restrictions harm the market for computer information products. They 
contribute to establishing a vibrant and diverse market in information. 
They take an otherwise sterile environment and provide a diversity of 
value and functionality tailored to particular consumer or business 
markets. 
Yet, many mass market licenses give greater rights than would 
pass to the buyer at a first sale. Licenses define the product. 
Depending on the market being targeted by the publisher, those 
product definitions may and often do exceed the authority given to a 
buyer at a first sale. To review this side of licensing, consider the 
following: 
 
 112. 84 F. Supp.2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (distribution agreement was a license rather than 
a sale conveying ownership). 
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Illustration 7. Clip-art Software 
Publisher distributes a “clip art” product for use in connection 
with various popular programs that enable users to make and 
display slide presentations for use in speeches. Copies of the 
clip art are made available through mass-market outlets, 
online, or at retail stores. The clip art license provides that the 
end-user may 1) make copies of the art in slide presentations, 
2) publicly display copies of the art in connection with 
speeches and other presentations, and 3) make and distribute 
paper copies of slides containing the clip art so long as those 
copies are not sold for a fee separate from any speaking or 
similar fee the user receives. 
In this scenario, the license contractually removes limitations that 
copyright law would otherwise place on a person who buys a copy of 
the clip art. The licensee receives greater rights than a buyer. The 
buyer at a first sale does not have the right to make and distribute 
copies. Had a buyer done such things and litigation ensued, they 
might have been treated as fair uses that did not infringe the 
copyright anyway, but the license makes clear the enhanced rights of 
the licensee. In this case, unless the licensed rights could be granted, 
the product would have no value. In effect, the license creates a new 
product and, in practice, created a new field of commerce. 
Illustration 8. Document preparation software 
Publisher develops software that allows users to create and 
send electronic documents. The documents are created using 
the “Create” program provided with the software. To be 
viewed by the recipient, the recipient must have access to a 
“Viewer” program, a copy of which is included in the product. 
The publisher distributes the software in copies in the mass-
market. The license gives the end-user the right to make and 
distribute an unlimited number of copies of the Viewer 
program to be distributed to any person he chooses. 
Once again, the license authorizes making and distributing copies 
(of the Viewer program) in a manner that would not be permitted 
under a simple first sale. The licensee receives greater rights than a 
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buyer. The court in Green Book Int’l Corp. v. InUnity Corp.113 said, 
that without the shrink-wrap license and the distributed Viewer 
programs, the product would be worthless.114 Yet, a first sale gives 
the buyer neither the right to make, nor the right to distribute, 
unlimited numbers of copies of the work. That right arose solely 
through the contract. 
Illustration 9. Free Shareware 
Publisher develops a program (a type of software sometimes 
described as shareware) which it makes available free of 
charge to the mass market. It distributes the software by online 
access to the program at Publisher’s Web site. There is a 
license which disclaims warranties but also provides: “Copy 
this game! . . . Remember—copies must be unaltered and 
complete . . . Don’t charge for copies or try to make a profit 
from TaskMaker or its distribution . . . Commercial 
distribution prohibited, as is distribution in exchange for 
compensation or any other consideration.” 
Without a license, a person who downloads a copy of the game 
would not have a right to make additional copies and distribute them. 
It would be possible, perhaps, for a court to find an implied license, 
but some courts would not do so and the license here makes clear 
both the breadth and the limitations of the right to make copies. 
Under such circumstances, the court in Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software 
of the Month Club115 held that it was not a fair use to make copies and 
distribute them for a fee, but it would have been an authorized 
(licensed) use for that same person to make and distribute copies for 
free if the license created an effective contract. 
The information market entails a mass customization that exists in 
no other context. Mass customization occurs because a digital 
information provider can create and publish (either online or in 
copies) a single work, but customize it in ways that fit narrow or 
individual markets or market niches without changing the work itself. 
 
 113. 2 F. Supp.2d 112 (D. Mass. 1998). 
 114. Id. at 116. 
 115. 13 F. Supp.2d 782 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
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That capacity flows from the license. For example, the difference 
between a single-user word processing program and a 100 person 
product rests in the terms of use in the license. The program itself is 
identical; what changes is the scope of use authorized under the 
license. Similarly, the distinction between a consumer use and a 
commercial use license may entail multiple dollar values, but rests 
only in what uses the license authorizes. 
Mass Market Licenses 
Some argue, that licensing in the mass market produces a great 
disadvantage for the consumer and other mass market transferee. This 
disadvantage clearly does not exist. In fact, we have already 
discussed a number of cases in which it is clear that a mass market 
license provides palpable benefits to consumers as well as to 
publishers.  
Licensing facilitates a unique combination of mass distribution 
and availability along with tailored use terms and opportunities— 
consumers benefit. A tailoring effect is efficiently achieved here that 
cannot be replicated under other formats. There is also a benefit in 
the preservation of property rights which, presumably, have in 
themselves a net gain in promoting innovation and distribution of 
innovative or creative products. 
The functions of a license in the mass market are different from 
that of a manufacturer’s warranty in sales of goods. A license 
implements property rights permissions to end users (or other persons 
contractually acquiring a license) in return for a price that is either 
paid directly to the publisher or indirectly through the purchase from 
an intermediary, such as the retail store at which a copy is acquired. 
The core justification for standard-form licenses lies partly in the fact 
that they enable an efficient means of offering differentiated products 
to the mass market. The fact is that the efficiencies of mass market 
licensing practices benefit both the producer and the purchaser-
licensee in terms of lower acquisition or transfer costs and by the fact 
that parties can choose the product they desire to provide or to 
acquire based on price and usefulness to them.  
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VII. SUMMARY 
Licensing computer information is not a mere re-characterization 
of commercial practice with respect to sales of goods. Licensing is 
the transactional structure that supports the unique and diverse range 
of computer information products and establishes a functional and 
efficient distribution channel allowing wide distribution of computer 
information to consumers and others. It is a method of doing business 
used throughout a multi-billion dollar industry that leads the modern 
economy. Numerous illustrations show this practice as a practical 
matter and also document that the effect of licensing in consumer and 
other markets is diverse, productive, and efficient.  
In the consumer market and elsewhere, the license is the product 
because the license defines what uses the licensee may make of the 
licensed information. Mass market licensing allows publishers to 
facilitate and establish a vibrant market for digital information that 
benefits consumers both as consumers and as members of an 
economy and that provides a means for mass availability of 
customized information and services. 
The legal justification is clear. The vast majority of all courts that 
have addressed the question hold that licenses of digital information 
under standard form contracts are enforceable, whether the contracts 
are made online, in direct contact between the publisher and the end 
user, or through so-called shrink-wrap licenses where the end user 
and publisher do not directly deal with each other.116  
This is an important area in commerce. It is vital that fears of the 
future and images of the past do not lead us to act in a way that 
wrongly encumbers and constrains one of the true sources of 
innovation and economic growth that has been fueling the modern 
economy and generating formerly undreamed of benefits.  
 
 116. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Register.com, Inc. 
v. Verio, 126 F. Supp.2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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